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THE DEMISE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
STANDING:  FROM STANDING ROOM
TO CENTER ORCHESTRA
Nadia B. Soree*
“It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
More than 120 years after Justice Bradley’s call to vigilance against
“stealthy encroachments,” the federal government has more than taken its first
steps towards crossing the constitutional boundaries of the people’s right to
privacy; it has walked for miles.  Recently, the Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Justice issued a scathing report, detailing “widespread abuse of the
FBI’s authority to seize personal details about tens of thousands of people with-
out court oversight” and further finding that the FBI “hatched an agreement
with telephone companies allowing the agency to ask for information on more
than 3,000 phone numbers—often without a subpoena, without an emergency
or even without an investigative case.”2  Justice Bradley might wonder what
has happened to his expansive conception of the Fourth Amendment,3 and how
(or if) today’s Court might heed his warning.  He might ask, “Isn’t this a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment?”  Today’s Court might answer, “What’s it to
you?”
Nearly thirty years ago, in a trio of decisions authored by then Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court answered defendants with precisely the same
question.  In Rakas v. Illinois,4 United States v. Salvucci,5 and Rawlings v.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law.  B.M. 1991, The
Juilliard School; M.M. 1993, Rutgers University; J.D. 2005, Yale Law School.  I wish to
thank Alfredo Garcia, Molly Lothamer, Robert Pushaw, Christopher Slobogin, and Kate
Stith for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).  The Latin phrase, obsta principiis,
translates to “oppose beginnings” or “oppose first attempts.”
2 Dan Eggen & John Solomon, FBI Audit Prompts Calls for Reform:  Some Lawmakers
Suggest Limits on Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at A1.
3 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
5 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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Kentucky,6 the Court held that unless a defendant has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the place searched, she will not be permitted to assert a Fourth
Amendment violation arising from that search as the basis for suppressing the
evidence being offered against her in a criminal prosecution.  However, while
the suitability of a given litigant to invoke the powers of the court for relief has
traditionally been referred to under the rubric of “standing,” the Court, in
Rakas, disapproved of the continued use of that term, instead merging the con-
cept of a defendant’s ability to seek the benefit of the exclusionary rule with the
inquiry into the substantive scope of the Fourth Amendment.7
Many scholars have critiqued the Court’s Fourth Amendment standing
doctrine for a variety of reasons,8 and I join the chorus with my view that the
Court has developed an unduly narrow vision of standing (and thus, the Fourth
Amendment) that fails to take into account the collective, regulatory objective
of the Amendment and of its primary remedy—exclusion.  However, the main
focus of this Article is the Court’s collapse of the standing inquiry into the
merits of a Fourth Amendment claim, a doctrinal move that, while noted by
scholars, has not generally been the primary focus of analysis.9  I hope to
demonstrate that with this move, the Court not only effectively restricted the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, but helped ensure that its narrow, individual-
istic view would endure.
To form a backdrop against which this argument can be developed, it is
necessary to begin with a few thoughts on judicial activism in general and with
respect to criminal procedure rules in particular.  In an excellent article, Profes-
sor Stephen F. Smith provides a highly useful, ideologically neutral definition
of judicial activism, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions.10
According to Professor Smith, substantive activism is implicated when a court
reaches a decision at odds with the text or structure of the constitutional or
6 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
7 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (“But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent
of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti-
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.”).  I will continue to use the
term as a useful shorthand to describe the legal ability of a particular defendant to suppress
evidence on the basis of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
8 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (1983); Donald L. Doernberg, “The Right of the People”:  Reconciling
Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259
(1983); William A. Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Stand-
ing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 MO. L. REV. 1 (1975); Richard B. Kuhns, The
Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. REV.
493 (1980); Ira Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois:  From
Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1981); Eulis Simien, Jr., The
Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unrea-
sonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a
Search and Seizure:  The Passing of Old Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 387 (1981); Richard A. Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expec-
tations of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directions for Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA.
L. REV. 831 (1979).
9 But see Kuhns, supra note 8, at 539-51, for a thorough and insightful discussion of the
abolition of standing as an independent inquiry.
10 Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint:  Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1057 (2002).
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statutory provision being adjudicated, when a court overrules precedent without
proper justification under relevant stare decisis rules, or when a court distin-
guishes or limits precedent on tenuous grounds.11  Procedural activism, on the
other hand, may be suspected when a court chooses to reach the merits of an
issue despite justiciability rules that would (or should) otherwise restrain the
court from so doing, or when a court decides more than is necessary to dispose
of the case before it.12
There is little doubt that the Court’s decisions in Rakas, Salvucci, and
Rawlings are substantively activist decisions.  After all, in the course of these
three opinions, the Court in effect rewrote the Fourth Amendment by erasing
“effects” from the text itself, obliterated several existing standing doctrines, and
arguably misread or misapplied prior cases.13  Whether these decisions are also
procedurally activist is somewhat less clear.  Standing is one aspect of jus-
ticiability that inhabits two worlds at once:  the question of who may raise a
claim under a given constitutional or statutory provision is informed by the
substance of the relevant provision.14  I propose that these decisions are proce-
durally as well as substantively activist—the Court decided more, and less,
than was necessary.
So, how activist were the Burger and Rehnquist Courts?  When Richard
Nixon had (and took) the opportunity to change the composition of the Court
with four of his own appointees, including a replacement for Chief Justice Earl
Warren, it was widely thought that many of the Warren-era criminal procedure
landmarks would not survive.15  Yet today there is considerable disagreement
as to the extent of the Counter-Revolution (if it was).16  Commentators suggest
that “the basic structure of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurispru-
dence is firmly ‘entrenched.’”17  The post-Warren Courts overruled “surpris-
ingly few”18 of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions, and, in fact,
in Dickerson v. United States,19 not only did Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
opinion for the Court, not overrule the (then) highly controversial Miranda v.
11 Id. at 1089.
12 Id. at 1093-94.
13 See discussion infra Part IV.
14 See discussion infra Part III.
15 The Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is commonly referred to as the
“Criminal Procedure Revolution,” as during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, the rights of
criminal defendants were significantly expanded.  Some scholars mark the start of the
Revolution as the Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
16 See generally THE BURGER COURT:  THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983).  Professor Smith also uses a variation of Professor Blasi’s title as a subsec-
tion heading:  “The Counterrevolution That Was (And Is).”  Smith, supra note 10, at 1069.
17 Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?  Two Audi-
ences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2467 (1996) (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Procedure in the Warren and Burger
Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 208 (1980)).
18 Smith, supra note 10, at 1114.
19 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that Congress may not, by
statute, govern the admissibility of statements made in the absence of Miranda warnings).
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Arizona,20 he elevated the Miranda rule to constitutional status.21  However,
by the time Dickerson came before the Court, Miranda had already been sig-
nificantly tamed in a variety of ways, and in Justice Rehnquist’s own words,
“our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legiti-
mate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling . . . .”22
In fact, this is precisely the source of the disagreement mentioned above:
in a variety of criminal procedure contexts, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
left intact the Warren Court’s constitutional norms, instead focusing their
counter-revolutionary efforts on the consequences for violations of those
norms.  In an insightful article, Professor Carol Steiker argues that the most
dramatic departures from the Warren Court’s vision of criminal procedure have
occurred at the level of what she terms “decision rules” (rules addressed to the
courts), while “conduct rules” (rules addressed to the police, delineating consti-
tutional requirements) have been less prone to attack.23
Professor Steiker presents an additional descriptive claim as well:  that the
result of this disparity between decision rules and conduct rules creates an
“acoustic separation” between the police and the public, in that the police,
through training and work experience, have direct access to the Court’s deci-
sion rules, while the public, through the media, has access primarily to the
conduct rules, which have remained relatively constant.24  Thus, the police
have a much more sophisticated view of criminal procedure,25 while the public
remains confident that individual rights continue to flourish long after the War-
20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements made by suspects
during the course of custodial interrogations in the absence of certain warnings are
inadmissible).
21 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (“We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of
this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule
Miranda ourselves.”).
22 Id. at 443.  For a thorough discussion of the ways in which the impact of Miranda has
been reduced, see Smith, supra note 10, at 1110; Steiker, supra note 17, at 2479-85.
23 Steiker, supra note 17, at 2469-70.  Professor Steiker adapts these terms from Professor
Meir Dan-Cohen, originally by way of Jeremy Bentham. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625,
626 (1984) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., Basil
Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1948) (1776 & 1789)).  Professor Steiker points to the proliferation
of what she terms “inclusionary rules,” which permit the introduction at trial of unconstitu-
tionally derived evidence or uphold convictions based on such evidence.  Steiker, supra note
17, at 2504-05.
24 Steiker, supra note 17, at 2470-71.  The term “acoustic separation” is also borrowed from
Professor Dan-Cohen. See supra note 23.
25 One obvious example of law enforcement’s sophistication with respect to the Court’s
decision rules can be found in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).  In Payner,
government agents, in a carefully planned operation, unlawfully seized the briefcase of a
bank officer in order to view and photograph defendant’s bank records, contained in the
briefcase.  In the subsequent trial, the defendant was convicted of filing a falsified tax return
and was, as expected by the agents, in light of recent standing rules, denied standing to
suppress the evidence stemming from the search and seizure of the bank officer’s briefcase.
Doernberg, supra note 8, at 291.  “[T]he Burger Court’s new standing rules . . . have actually
encouraged law enforcement officials deliberately to violate fourth amendment principles
because they know that the fruits of such violations will not be excluded and will benefit the
government’s case.” Id.
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ren Court Revolution.26  Professor Steiker rejects the strong purposive account
that the Court was not only aware of this separation, but in fact, intended it “as
a strategy for ‘bluffing’ the public while essentially winking at the police.”27
However, she posits a more modest purposive account.  By this account, a con-
servative Court, while antagonistic towards the Warren Court’s criminal proce-
dure doctrines, will choose a less dramatic route to alter these doctrines for
various reasons, including its perception of its proper judicial role, deference to
the rules of stare decisis, and reputational considerations.28
It is with this second, more modest purposive account in mind that I turn
to the Fourth Amendment.  Maintaining this decision-conduct rule dichotomy,
Fourth Amendment scope decisions may also be categorized along three
dimensions, the first two of which coincide roughly with conduct-rule decisions
and the third with decision-rule decisions:  (1) decisions defining the substance
of the Amendment,29 (2) decisions delineating the exceptions to the require-
ments of the Amendment (once it is clear that the Amendment is triggered by
the police behavior at issue),30 and (3) decisions that indicate whether or not a
remedy is available (once it is clear that the Amendment has been violated).31
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively categorize the
myriad of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment, I do
hope to provide a simplified, but helpful, framework for analyzing the different
avenues by which the Court has narrowed the scope of the Fourth Amend-
26 There are a variety of reasons for the public’s more limited access to decision rules,
including the relative complexity of these rules as compared to that of conduct rules, making
them more difficult for the public to digest and the media to report.
27 Steiker, supra note 17, at 2541.
28 Id. at 2542.
29 I refer, for the most part, to decisions defining the core terms such as “searches” and
“seizures,” or defining what constitutes “probable cause.”  For example, United States v.
Place defines a search (in the negative) by holding that a canine sniff of a suitcase is not one
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  462 U.S. 696 (1983); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974) (examination of paint scrapings from exterior of defendant’s car invades no
legitimate expectation of privacy).  As an example delineating the contours of a Fourth
Amendment seizure, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), in which the Court held
that the encounter between police and a passenger on a bus, in light of all the circumstances,
was not a seizure.
30 Most notably, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), relaxed the probable cause standard by
requiring a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk in certain situations.
As another example, the Court held, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976),
that neither probable cause nor a warrant is required when police conduct a nonpretextual
inventory search pursuant to established procedures.  Decisions pertaining to consent
searches and so-called “special needs” searches would also fall into this category. See Skin-
ner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (special needs, beyond normal law
enforcement needs, such as the need to investigate railroad accidents to ensure public safety,
may justify searches, such as drug testing, without warrant or individualized suspicion);
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (consent valid from third party with sufficient
relationship to searched premises).
31 The paradigmatic case for this category is, of course, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), establishing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, when officers act in
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later determined to be lacking in probable cause.
Many scholars also see standing decisions as limitations on the availability of the exclusion-
ary rule remedy. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Knox, supra note 8, at 1.
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ment’s protection and how, in the case of standing, it has increased the durabil-
ity of its constricted view.32
If one accepts pre-Rakas standing as a category (3) decision rule, acting as
a limitation on the availability of the exclusionary rule, and one also accepts
Professor Steiker’s observation that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
altered decision rules to a much greater extent than conduct rules, the implica-
tions of the elimination of an independent standing inquiry are striking.  By
merging standing with the substantive Fourth Amendment inquiry, the Court
has in effect shifted standing from a decision rule to a conduct rule.  Keeping in
mind a given Court’s awareness of its judicial role, hesitation to overrule major
precedents, and reluctance to appear activist or politically motivated, one can
predict that post-Rakas “standing” doctrine is much more secure from future
judicial modification than it otherwise might have been.
In Part II of this Article, I further develop the tension between judicial
restraint and activism, and conduct rules versus decision rules, and elaborate on
the various pressures that promote constancy in judicial doctrine.  In Part III, I
discuss traditional notions of standing, primarily in the context of other consti-
tutional provisions, to demonstrate the inconsistency of the Court’s standing
doctrine.  In this discussion, I focus on the Court’s third-party standing juris-
prudence because the Court has chosen to frame the denial of Fourth Amend-
ment standing in third-party terms, despite the obvious inconsistency of
insisting on an individualistic reading of the Amendment for standing purposes
in order to limit the application of the decidedly (and purposefully) collective
exclusionary remedy.33  Here, I hope to demonstrate that the doctrine of third-
party standing is an inherently policy-laden and flexible one, leading to the
argument that if the Court wanted to preserve its narrow view of Fourth
Amendment standing against future shifts in policy, it needed to make the doc-
trinal move it made in Rakas, bumping standing up to a level (1) conduct rule
status.
In Part IV, I discuss the development of Fourth Amendment standing doc-
trine, with particular emphasis on the Court’s decisions in Rakas, Rawlings,
and Salvucci.34  I ask the reader’s indulgence in advance, for I have chosen to
quote abundantly from the cases, in order to best illustrate the extent to which
32 I wish to point out that, in categorizing Fourth Amendment decisions along these three
dimensions, I presume a warrant and probable cause requirement for all searches and
seizures, with exceptions thereto, rather than a general reasonableness requirement.  I do this
for clarity of classification only, without expressing a preference for either construction.
33 It is precisely the collective, deterrent nature of the exclusionary rule that also permits the
Court to limit its application, even when the evidence is being included against a defendant
who, by the Court’s definition, clearly would have standing to contest the search.
34 Although, in the United States Reports, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980),
appears before Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), both were decided on the same
day, and I discuss Rawlings first because the Court will rely on that decision heavily in
crafting its opinion in Salvucci.  I wish to clarify that this Article is concerned with standing
in the context of searches and seizures of effects pursuant to those searches.  This is not to
say that a defendant whose person, as opposed to effects, has been unlawfully seized may
not contest the legality of the seizure and move to suppress evidence discovered in a search
conducted pursuant to the allegedly unlawful seizure of her person.  In fact, even though
after Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), mere passengers cannot claim a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the searched automobile, passengers in an automobile subject to a
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the Burger Court’s decisions departed from, and at times completely misstated,
prior precedent.  To ensure, therefore, that I myself am not guilty of doing the
same, I prefer the Court’s words to my own wherever feasible.
In Part V, I offer a few alternatives to current doctrine, each of which in
my view would offer a more attractive approach to Fourth Amendment stand-
ing than the one taken by the Court.  Finally, in Part VI, I discuss several con-
sequences, theoretical and practical, of the Court’s decision to merge standing
with the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, although Justice Rehnquist
himself underplayed the potential effects of this approach.35  Perhaps I see
more in this doctrinal move than there really is to see.  After all, nothing much
has changed in standing doctrine since Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci, but that
might be precisely the point!  The actual (as opposed to theoretical) effect of
this move may not be fully realized until the ideological composition of the
Court changes significantly, or such cases come before the Court that compel it
to reconsider its individualistic view of the Fourth Amendment.  In the
meantime, in its standing decisions, the Court did what I have on occasion done
myself:  it started the performance in the standing room section, then at inter-
mission, discreetly moved to Center Orchestra.
II. RESTRAINT AS ACTIVISM
The heading for this section is inspired by the title of Professor Smith’s
article, in which he argues that a Court’s activism, in response to a prior
Court’s activism in the opposite ideological direction, is actually a form of
restraint that helps to restore equilibrium to the law.36  As mentioned above, the
Burger Court’s standing doctrine, as constructed by Justice Rehnquist, was
quite activist, although standing rules are generally thought to promote the
value of judicial restraint.  As will be further discussed in the following Part,
standing rules prevent the counter-majoritarian judiciary from encroaching on
the prerogative of the political branches to decide questions of wide public
significance.  In addition, however, standing rules also serve as a restraint on a
current Court in relation to future Courts.37  Because future Courts are bound,
at least to a degree, by rules of stare decisis, a current Court should refrain from
deciding too much or from setting too many precedents, in order to give the law
the opportunity to develop over time and to avoid putting a future Court in the
traffic stop are seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Brendlin v. California, 127 S.
Ct. 2400 (2007).
35 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (“Rigorous application of the principle that the rights secured
by this Amendment are personal, in place of a notion of ‘standing,’ will produce no addi-
tional situations in which evidence must be excluded.  The inquiry under either approach is
the same.”).
36 Smith, supra note 10, at 1098.  Professor Smith calls this type of responsorial activism
“reactivism,” and while reactivism is an ideologically neutral concept, it is demonstrated by
examining the conservative reaction of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to the activism of
the liberal Warren Court. Id.
37 Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:  Perspectives on the “Case or Contro-
versy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (1979).
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uncomfortable position of having to exercise a wholesale repudiation of doc-
trines with which it strongly disagrees.38
There are, of course, benefits to adhering to stare decisis rules, including
expediency and stability of doctrine, and long-standing precedents have often
generated significant reliance interests that the Court may be reluctant to
ignore, even if it feels those precedents were incorrectly decided.  In fact, the
Rehnquist Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,39 stated that “a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason
over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”40  The types
of special reasons that the Rehnquist Court has accepted as justification for
overruling precedent have tended to be policy-oriented, for example, finding
that a precedent has proved unworkable due to subsequent factual develop-
ments, rather than finding (or acknowledging) error in the Court’s prior inter-
pretation of the Constitution, resulting in a more “Court-centered than
Constitution-centered” vision of constitutional law.41
In addition to stare decisis rules, Professor Akhil Amar describes other
subtle pressures at work that further insulate precedents from future assault,
whether correctly decided or not.  First, the Court views itself as a continuous
entity42:  “Justices casually refer to what ‘we’ the Court decided a century ago.
Thus, a later Court that rejects an earlier ‘proposal’ must admit that ‘we’ made
a mistake.”43  This, of course, is difficult to admit, especially when the integrity
of the Court as an institution is at stake!  New appointees, who often, especially
recently, have been appointed from the lower federal courts,44 may feel obliged
to defer to the judgment of their more senior colleagues.  As they gain senior-
ity, the case law increasingly reflects their input, and even if they question their
earlier votes, it may be just as hard for the individual Justices to admit that “I”
was wrong, as it is for the Court as a whole to admit that “we” were wrong.45
Professor Amar’s account of the constraints upon Justices when revisiting
precedent fits well with Professor Steiker’s observation, discussed earlier, that
the Burger Court waged its Counter-Revolution on the Warren Court’s prece-
dents by altering decision rules (rules addressed to courts, such as those dealing
38 Id.  When a Court overrules too many precedents, it risks being perceived as activist, and
the integrity of the Court may be called into question.  Commentators have noted the number
of precedents the Warren Court overruled during the Criminal Procedure Revolution. See
Smith, supra note 10, at 1069.  An additional concern, however, is that, especially in the
context of criminal procedure, the Court’s major decisions tend to generate an extensive
body of doctrine, so Courts are all the more reluctant to pull the thread that may unravel the
entire fabric. See id. at 1113.
39 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword:  The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 81 (2000).
40 Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
41 Amar, supra note 39, at 82.
42 Article III of the Constitution envisions a continuous body, as Justices are appointed for
life, and thus, the face of the Court changes gradually, rather than all at once every set
number of years, as is the case with the political branches. Id. at 40.
43 Id.
44 While serving on the lower courts, judges are, of course, bound to follow Supreme Court
precedent. See id. at 88.
45 Id.
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with the admission of evidence) more extensively than conduct rules (rules
addressed to the police, delineating the parameters of constitutionally accept-
able conduct), which are more accessible to the public.46  Because of their high
public visibility, the concerns for reputational harm outlined above will be
magnified in the context of conduct rules, and it logically follows that a given
Court would be more reluctant to overrule these types of decisions.47
Although Professor Steiker notes that this preference for altering decision
rules while leaving the doctrine more or less intact is somewhat less pro-
nounced in the post-Warren Courts’ Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when
compared to that of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, she maintains that the
decision rule departures are nonetheless more extreme.48  The Burger and
Rehnquist Courts did indeed alter the Warren Court’s conduct rules (and not
always in ways that are accommodating to law enforcement).49  The post-War-
ren Courts narrowed the scope of Fourth Amendment protection by their defini-
tions of searches,50 seizures,51 and consent,52 and with the proliferation of
“special needs” exceptions.53  Recalling the classification model I sketched out
in Part I,54 those decisions defining searches and seizures, and thus the substan-
tive reach of the Fourth Amendment, would be placed in category (1), while
those decisions defining consent and characterizing special needs would be
placed in category (2), as they delineate exceptions to those substantive
requirements.
We turn now to decision rules, which would be placed in category (3), as
this species of rule governs the availability and scope of what is considered
virtually the only remedy for a Fourth amendment violation:  the exclusionary
rule.  Relying ever more exclusively on its deterrent rationale, the post-Warren
Courts propagated a host of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including, most
significantly, the “good-faith” exception, when a search or seizure is conducted
46 See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
47 Professor Smith, however, observes that the particular makeup of the Warren Court, con-
sisting largely of individuals with considerable political experience, may have contributed to
the apparent ease with which that Court overruled so many prior precedents.  Smith, supra
note 10, at 1104 n.188.
48 Steiker, supra note 17, at 2503.
49 See id. at 2485-2503 for an excellent analysis of the various doctrinal departures from the
Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including a discussion of the ways in
which the Warren Court’s own precedents set the stage for these departures.  It is interesting
to note the various ways in which the post-Warren Courts actually bolstered the warrant
requirement.
50 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no legitimate expectation of
privacy in curbside garbage left out for collection); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986) (no Fourth Amendment search when officers fly over and photograph fenced back
yard from navigable airspace); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no legitimate
expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed and recorded by a “pen register”).
51 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (bus sweep not a seizure).
52 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search valid even if
consenting individual unaware that he may withhold such consent).
53 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that school officials con-
ducting searches of students do not require warrants or probable cause); see also supra text
accompanying note 30.
54 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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in good-faith reliance on what is eventually deemed to be an invalid warrant.55
In addition to the good-faith exception, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts also
narrowed the conception of what is considered a “fruit” of an unlawful search
or seizure,56 while expanding the permitted uses of unlawfully obtained evi-
dence to impeach a defendant at trial.57
Paradoxically, these exceptions to the exclusionary rule are all justified by
the Court’s reasoning that excluding reliable evidence in these situations will
either fail to promote the rule’s deterrent purpose or will deter police miscon-
duct only minimally, especially when balanced against society’s interest in
punishing obviously guilty defendants.58  On the other hand, however, in for-
mulating its standing doctrine, the Burger Court espoused an individualistic,
personal-right view of the Fourth Amendment that is completely at odds with
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.59  While I do not intend in this
Article to attack or defend the exclusionary rule,60 I would argue that the
Court’s own view of the rule as something less than a true remedy meant to
compensate the victim of a violation, and more (or exclusively) for purposes of
deterring future violations, would ordinarily place exclusionary rule decisions
at the most risk of being overturned or altered, either by future Courts or,
potentially, by Congress.  After all, the Court has declined to grant the exclu-
sionary rule the sanctity of constitutional status, although it chose to do so for
the Miranda rule in Dickerson.61  What has been noted by many scholars, how-
ever, is that despite the exclusionary rule’s non-constitutional stature, concern
with its “costs”62 seems to be the driving force behind most of the Court’s
substantive scope decisions, and these, as we shall see, are not so easily modi-
fied.  In Justice White’s words:  “If the Court is troubled by the practical impact
of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule’s continued validity
55 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
56 See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (evidence not excluded if it can
be shown to be derived from a source independent of the illegal search); Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984) (evidence not excluded if it would have been inevitably discovered).
57 See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally seized evidence may be used
to impeach defendant’s statements, elicited on cross-examination, after general denial of
guilt on direct examination).
58 It is, however, certainly conceivable that the above exceptions to the exclusionary rule
will actually provide incentive to officers to violate the Fourth Amendment.
59 Kuhns, supra note 8, at 501 (“[T]he standing requirement . . . necessarily undermines the
rule’s regulatory objectives.”); Simien, supra note 8, at 532 (“The personal nature of the
standing inquiry and the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule are fundamentally at
war with each other. . . .  As these concepts serve different masters, they should be main-
tained as separate as possible in the Court’s analysis.”); see also Sherry F. Colb, Standing
Room Only:  Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically
Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1666-67 (2007) (“I propose that standing doctrine is not
simply in tension with the goals of the exclusionary rule, but that, properly applied with the
ex post perspective that defines Fourth Amendment standing, the doctrine altogether pre-
cludes the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights by any defendant bringing a suppression
motion at his or her criminal trial.”).
60 For an excellent exposition of the various arguments on either side of the exclusionary
rule fence, see Dripps, supra note 31, at 5-22.
61 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436 (2000); see supra note 21.
62 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“Each time the exclusionary rule is
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights.”).
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squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to reach what are
perceived as the correct results in specific cases.”63
If standing doctrine is viewed as an exception to the exclusionary rule,
then the Burger Court’s move to eliminate an independent standing inquiry by
folding it into the substantive Fourth Amendment determination is, to my mind,
a fascinating one.  After Rakas, standing doctrine has been elevated from a
level (3) decision-rule status to a level (1) conduct-rule status, potentially insu-
lating it from alteration for all the reasons already noted.  While, as will be
discussed in the next Part, it is entirely proper to view standing in relation to the
substantive scope of the Fourth Amendment (or whichever statutory or consti-
tutional provision is at issue in a given case),64 the standing inquiry should not
be completely substituted for a decision on the merits.  Under such a construc-
tion, standing is asked to do too much, and, in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, too little is asked of substance in return, as the police conduct that
uncovered the evidence is potentially left completely unexamined.65  Arguably,
in the Burger Court’s standing decisions, from the perspective of the police, the
Fourth Amendment was violated.66  The question becomes one of whose
Fourth Amendment rights were violated, from the perspective of the defendant,
or rather, from the Court’s perspective of the defendant’s perspective.67
It seems curious, then, that a rule that does not address police conduct
would essentially become a conduct rule.  As we shall see, this has some troub-
ling implications.  Perhaps, however, the trouble has less to do with the struc-
ture of standing than with the test that, after Rakas, Salvucci, and Rawlings,
defines both a search and whether a defendant has standing to suppress evi-
dence gathered as a result of an allegedly unlawful search and seizure:  the
“legitimate expectation of privacy” test.68  Of all the terms contained in the
63 Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
64 See discussion infra Part III.
65 See discussion infra Part VI.
66 See Colb, supra note 59, at 1665-73.  Professor Sherry Colb argues that substantive vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment are assessed on the basis of the police officer’s ex ante
perspective.  For example, whether there was probable cause for a search depends on what
the officer knew at the time of the search.  However, the standing determination hinges on
the defendant’s ex post perspective, and the factual reality of the defendant’s relationship to
the location searched, regardless of what the police officer believed that relationship to be.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Professor Amar contrasts the United States Reports, “filled with a mindnumbing array of
formulas, tests, prongs, and tiers, often phrased in highly abstract legal jargon . . . that insu-
lates and anesthetizes” with the brevity and concreteness of the document the Court seeks to
interpret—the Constitution.  Amar, supra note 39, at 46.  Professor Amar continues, “But
often doctrine-speak becomes an end in itself, displacing candid discussion of substantive
constitutional values and distancing the people from our supreme law.” Id.  The “legitimate
expectation of privacy” is an example of just such a formula, which, through the Court’s
treatment, has become far removed from the societal expectations it purports to represent.  I
have argued elsewhere that, in the context of voluntariness determinations for confessions,
the “totality of circumstances” test has also become “jargon,” and rather than engaging in a
meaningful review, as the name of the test urges, courts “use the totality test much like a
checklist, maneuvering through and balancing the factors on one or the other side of the
voluntariness scale, without careful review of any one factor to determine its actual coercive
effect on the defendant, to arrive at the decision they wish to reach.”  Nadia Soree, Com-
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Fourth Amendment, the term “search” lends itself the most easily to definition
and redefinition.  Ironically, it was the Warren Court’s expansive vision of the
Fourth Amendment that led to the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test69
that in turn provided conservative Courts with an ideally malleable standard by
which to define a search.70  That standard, it turns out, was also well suited to
the Burger Court’s undertaking of limiting the class of persons permitted to
raise a Fourth Amendment claim to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence.  Before turning to a detailed discussion of Fourth Amendment standing,
the next Part provides an overview of general standing principles that inform
the discussion of standing in the Fourth Amendment context to follow.
III. STANDING OUTSIDE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. An Overview
Traditionally understood, the concept of standing, as one of the factors
determining justiciability, hinges on the ability of a given litigant to invoke the
powers of the court for relief.71  The first hurdle a potential litigant must over-
come has its source in Article III of the Constitution, which limits the role of
the federal courts to adjudicating “cases” and “controversies.”72  This limita-
tion has been interpreted to require of a litigant, as a constitutionally mandated
minimum, a showing that “he has suffered ‘injury in fact’ or ‘distinct and pal-
pable’ injury, that his injury has been has been caused by the conduct com-
plained of, and that his injury is fairly redressable by the remedy sought.”73
ment, When the Innocent Speak:  False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role
of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 206 (2005).  In a like manner, in the Court’s
hands, the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test has generated hierarchies of privacy inter-
ests and holders, without any careful analysis of what the actual expectations, of either
defendants or society, may be.
69 The “legitimate expectation of privacy” test was born out of Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My
understanding of the rule . . . is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
70 Reframing the interest at stake in terms of reasonable expectations of privacy without
offering any guidance as to reasonableness created a “normative vacuum for later Courts to
fill.”  Steiker, supra note 17, at 2495.  However, the Katz formulation was meant to supple-
ment traditional property interests and was not meant to completely replace them.  Alschuler,
supra note 8, at 7 n.12 (“Much of the trepidation that scholars have voiced concerning Katz
may stem from a failure to recognize that Katz supplemented earlier visions of [F]ourth
[A]mendment protections but did not supplant them.”); see also Simien, supra note 8, at
490.
71 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
72 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Related to the requirement of standing, the broader doc-
trine of justiciability prohibits the federal courts from determining political questions, issuing
advisory opinions, and adjudicating issues that have been “mooted by subsequent develop-
ments.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
73 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (footnotes
omitted) (citing, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152 (1970)).
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The interests advanced by these requirements may be “numbingly familiar”74
but bear repeating nonetheless.  It is presumed that truly adverse parties will
litigate the case effectively and vigorously, illuminating the arguments for the
court, and ensuring the court’s awareness of the concrete repercussions of its
decision.75  Additionally, the case or controversy requirement seeks to prevent
the counter-majoritarian judiciary from encroaching on the political branches or
from issuing advisory opinions.76
However, even if a litigant has met her Article III burden, which any
defendant seeking to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence arguably has, she
must meet additional, judicially created prudential standing requirements as
well.77  She must show, for example, that her injury is personal as to her, and
not one suffered equally by large numbers of the citizenry, as a matter of judi-
cial self-restraint in avoiding “be[ing] called upon to decide abstract questions
of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions.”78  Or, she may, and I emphasize the
word “may” to demonstrate the Court’s flexibility on this matter, be required to
74 Id.
75 Id.; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (“Have the appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumi-
nation of difficult constitutional questions?”).
76 Fletcher, supra note 73, at 222.  The standing requirement has generally been seen as a
limitation on the Court but was used by Justice Marshall to justify his argument, in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), for the propriety of judicial review.  John C. Reitz, Standing
to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 441 (2002) (“In that 1803 decision,
Justice Marshall justified the exercise of judicial review as a power the courts assert only
reluctantly, pursuant to their obligation under Article III to decide concrete ‘cases and con-
troversies’ according to the law, including the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.”).
However, the Court is increasingly moving from a paradigm in which constitutional adjudi-
cation stems from the Court’s function of protecting individual rights, to one in which
“[j]udicial protection of private rights has now become a by-product of—albeit an important
one—not the justification for constitutional adjudication.”  Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party
Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 280 (1984); see also Fletcher, supra note 73, at 227
(“[F]ederal litigation in the 1960’s and 1970’s increasingly involved attempts to establish
and enforce public, often constitutional, values by litigants who were not individually
affected by the conduct of which they complained in any way markedly different from most
of the population.”).
77 Prudential standing requirements are rooted in policy, and in fact, “there are at work in
the standing doctrine the many subtle pressures which tend to cause policy considerations to
blend into constitutional limitations.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 99.
78 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974)).  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), however, the Court rather clearly stated that the ban against recognizing standing for
generalized grievances has its foundation in the requirements of Article III, rather than on
the basis of prudential standing.
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not
state an Article III case or controversy.
Id. at 573-74.  Under either understanding, the criminal defendant seeking to suppress evi-
dence at her trial clearly suffers an injury that is particularized and unique from a generalized
injury suffered by the citizenry when the government violates the Fourth Amendment.
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show that her injury “belongs” to her and not to a third party.79  Justice Doug-
las, writing for the Court in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,80 formulated a two-part test that combines elements of Article III and
prudential standing:  in order for a plaintiff to have standing, she must allege
“injury in fact” as well as that “the interest sought to be protected . . . is argua-
bly within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.”81
Of course, determining the “zone of interests” of a given provision is a
normative, and extremely policy-laden, endeavor, and the Court’s standing doc-
trine has been widely criticized as inconsistent, to put it mildly.82  As Professor
John Reitz states, “The concern is that judges may manipulate the accordeon
folds of standing doctrine to open or shut the courthouse door based on their
views on the merits.”83  That concern, as will be demonstrated, is well founded
in the context of Fourth Amendment standing:  not only did the Court shut the
courthouse door, but locked it and hid the key.
Professor William Fletcher addresses the perceived incoherence of current
standing doctrine, proposing that courts
abandon the attempt to capture the question of who should be able to enforce legal
rights in a single formula, abandon the idea that standing is a preliminary jurisdic-
tional issue, and abandon the idea that Article III requires a showing of “injury in
fact.”  Instead, standing should simply be a question on the merits of plaintiff’s
claim. . . .  If a duty is constitutional, the constitutional clause should be seen not only
as the source of the duty, but also as the primary description of those entitled to
enforce it.84
According to this account of standing, injury cannot be defined in a non-norma-
tive way,85 but must be determined within the context of the particular provi-
sion against which the claim is being litigated.  As for causation and
redressability, which are two sides of the same coin, these, too, are functions of
the merits of the claim, completely dependent on the court’s definition of the
injury, which is, again, a normative endeavor.86
79 Although this is the traditional rule, litigants are increasingly permitted to raise the rights
of parties not before the court.  Monaghan, supra note 76, at 278.
80 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
81 Id. at 152-53.  Professor Fletcher notes that “[m]ore damage to the intellectual structure
of the law of standing can be traced to Data Processing than to any other single decision,” in
that this was the Court’s first decision to announce the “injury in fact” requirement, and that,
since this decision, the Court has treated “injury in fact” as a component of the Article III
requirement.  Fletcher, supra note 73, at 229-30.
82 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 73, at 221 (“The structure of standing law in the federal
courts has long been criticized as incoherent.”).
83 Reitz, supra note 76, at 444.  Professor Reitz, however, while not “absolv[ing]” the
courts of this charge, does allow that trying to maintain consistency, while leaving the door
open to significant private enforcement of constitutional rights, will naturally involve “diffi-
cult and inconsistent line drawing.” Id.
84 Fletcher, supra note 73, at 223-24 (footnote omitted).
85 Id.  A plaintiff will show injury in fact any time the allegations in her complaint are
proved.  The question is whether the injury is one that the court is willing to recognize, or,
put differently, whether the provision in question has conferred a cause of action on the
plaintiff.
86 See id. at 241-42 (discussing the true nature of the injury in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973), in which the Court denied standing to a mother of an illegitimate child
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Justice Rehnquist, at least in the context of the Fourth Amendment, has
chosen to see standing in precisely this light.  While this analysis is appealing,
and certainly correct insofar as the assertion that the injury is a function of the
scope of the constitutional right (much as the remedy is also), it is problematic
in the Fourth Amendment context.  It is especially so in light of the requirement
of a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the place searched as the
exclusive test for determining whether the defendant seeking to exclude evi-
dence obtained through an allegedly unlawful search has suffered a Fourth
Amendment injury.87  Thus, the fundamental point of contention is how the
Court has chosen to define the Fourth Amendment injury.  However, when the
Court uses standing, in particular the denial of standing, to define the injury
and, consequently, the right, the Court takes a bottom-up approach that pro-
motes a narrow, stagnant interpretation of the right at stake.  Before turning to
Fourth Amendment standing in greater detail, however, it is helpful to briefly
examine the flexibility and inconsistency of standing doctrine, particularly in
the contexts of taxpayer suits and third-party claims, to illustrate that “factual”
determinations of injury are in fact often normative judgments infused with
policy considerations and subjective interpretations.
B. Taxpayers and Other Suitors
In 1923, the Court, in Frothingham v. Mellon,88 denied standing to a tax-
payer claiming a due process takings violation where Congress, through the
Maternity Act of 1921, authorized a program of federal grants for states imple-
menting measures to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates.89  In reaching
its decision that the taxpayer failed to show such a direct injury as would confer
standing, the Court commented on the “comparatively minute and indetermin-
able” interest of one taxpayer among millions when weighed against the federal
treasury.90  In addition, the Court mentioned its concern that allowing such a
suit could possibly inundate the courts with countless such challenges to any
federal spending program that meets with opposition.91
More than forty years later, the Court had the opportunity to reexamine a
“barrier . . . erected against federal taxpayer suits [that had] never been
breached” to that point.92  The Court, in Flast v. Cohen, discussed the confu-
seeking to enjoin the State of Texas from discriminatory non-prosecution of child support
laws (delinquent fathers of illegitimate children were routinely not being prosecuted)
because a favorable disposition to her case was not likely to actually resolve what the Court
perceived to be her injury—the fact that she had not received support payments from her
child’s father).  Professor Fletcher argues that “[t]he critical question is not what Linda R.S.
‘really’ wanted.  Rather the question is whether she has a right under the equal protection
clause to force the prosecutor to stop discriminating between the fathers of legitimate and
illegitimate children.” Id. at 242.
87 See discussion infra Part IV.
88 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
89 Id. at 479-80.
90 Id. at 486-87 (comparing the much greater proportional interest of a municipal taxpayer
to a smaller, municipal treasury).
91 Id. at 487 (“If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same . . . .”).
92 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968).
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sion and controversy generated by the Frothingham decision because of the
uncertainty of the underlying source of its reasoning.93  While concerns of the
judiciary’s interference with the acts of another co-equal branch of government
are clearly informed by constitutional limitations inherent in the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court’s apparent concern with the size of a taxpayer’s
tax bill and the fear of excessive litigation “suggest[ ] pure policy considera-
tions.”94  The Flast Court noted that the factors influencing the Court’s deci-
sion in 1923 were in some ways no longer applicable in 1968.95  At the very
least, the Court reasoned that the “very existence [of the debate over Frothing-
ham] suggests that [it] should undertake a fresh examination of the limitations
upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations
to taxpayer suits.”96  The Court held that Article III presented no “absolute bar”
to federal taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of federal taxation or
spending programs.97  However, in order to establish the requisite Article III
concrete adverseness, the party seeking standing must establish a “logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.”98
Mrs. Flast was granted standing to pursue her claim, yet Mrs. Frothingham
was denied her opportunity to be heard.  Was the “injury in fact” any different?
Was the Court’s decision really based on a forty-year transformation in policy
and procedural considerations?  Perhaps.  Or was the Court instead making a
normative judgment that it was not objectionable to use Mrs. Frothingham’s
money to support a federal Maternity Act, but on the other hand, using Mrs.
Flast’s tax dollars to support parochial schools, violating the Establishment
Clause, might be?99  Thus, depending upon the constitutional violation
93 Id.
94 Id. at 93.
95 Id. at 94.  For example, the Court mentioned as a factor not at issue in 1923, the corporate
taxpayer who may have federal tax interest of “hundreds of millions of dollars,” and thus, a
much greater proportional interest to the federal treasury than to any given municipal trea-
sury.  In addition, the Court noted the subsequent development, under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, of such devices as joinder and class actions, which would alleviate the fear
of excessive burden on the court system from countless suits.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 101.
98 Id. at 102.  The Court held that the nexus required of a taxpayer required a two-part
inquiry.  First, the taxpayer needed to show a relationship between his status and the type of
act being challenged.  This required a relationship between the status as a taxpayer and the
government’s action pursuant to its taxing and spending power under Article I.  U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Second, the taxpayer had to establish a nexus between his status and a
specific constitutional violation.  Thus, the taxpayer needed to show not only that Congress
had exceeded its powers, but that in doing so, Congress exceeded a “specific constitutional
limitation[ ]” on the exercise of its taxing and spending ability, such as implied by the Estab-
lishment Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.  The Court has reaf-
firmed the rights of federal taxpayers to challenge expenditures that violate the
Establishment Clause, but has limited taxpayer standing to that particular grievance. Com-
pare Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (taxpayers had standing to raise an Establish-
ment Clause claim with respect to the application of the adolescent Family Life Act), with
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayers denied standing to challenge
expenditures allegedly violating Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution).
99 See Fletcher, supra note 73, at 228 (“Yet the Court granted standing because it sensed,
without being able to articulate it fully, that a broad grant of standing was an appropriate
mechanism to implement the establishment clause interest at stake.”).
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claimed, the same “injury in fact” may or may not confer standing upon an
individual.
This point is particularly well illustrated by McGowan v. Maryland,100
although not a case involving taxpayer standing.  In McGowan, several store
employees convicted of violating Maryland’s Sunday Closing Laws were
denied standing when they claimed these so-called Blue Laws violated their
right to free exercise of religion because, as the Court noted, they alleged only
economic harm and not that they were in any way denied religious liberty.101
However, the Court found that the employees did have standing when
alleging that the state laws were contrary to the Establishment Clause,102 and
engaged in an examination of the underlying policy behind the doctrine of
“separation of church and state.”103  The Court reasoned that had the Framers
been simply concerned with preserving individual religious freedom of choice,
the employees surely would have lacked standing for the reasons mentioned
above.104  The Court deferred to the “writings of Madison . . . [that] demon-
strate that the establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its
tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil authority.”105  Once the
Court viewed the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as a regulatory
provision, offering protection from a possibly tyrannical government by way of
concrete and enforceable limitations rather than a provision establishing indi-
vidual freedoms, the economic injury suffered by the employees as a result of
“the imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion” was sufficient to
confer standing.106
As we shall see, the similarities to standing in the Fourth Amendment
context are striking.  If one sees the Fourth Amendment as a regulatory provi-
sion imposing restrictions on the government’s conduct (as the Court appar-
ently does not, or at least no longer does), rather than as a purely personal right,
the inquiry, whether couched in terms of standing or substance, would produce
entirely different results.  However, because the Court has chosen to interpret
the Fourth Amendment right as a personal right to privacy and has denied
standing to one whose own constitutional rights (in the Court’s view) have not
been violated, it is useful to briefly examine the Court’s third-party standing
jurisprudence, with particular attention to the flexibility with which the Court
applies its self-imposed third-party standing rules.
The rule against allowing standing to press the constitutional claims of
third parties stems from broader justiciability concerns and the limitation of the
100 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
101 Id. at 429-30.  Interestingly, the Court also mentioned that the appellants failed to allege
that the religious beliefs of their potential patrons were affected, although the Court went on
to say that those whose rights were infringed could effectively assert their own rights. Id.
This statement indicates that the Court at least contemplated the possibility of third-party
standing.  Further, the Court noted that the “[a]ppellants present[ed] no weighty counter-
vailing policies here to cause an exception to [its] general principles.” Id. at 430.  This
statement, of course, indicates that prudential standing rules are, ultimately, policy-driven.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
103 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 430-31.
104 Id. at 430.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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judiciary not to “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it . . . [or] to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”107  However,
as the Court noted in United States v. Raines, the rule against third-party stand-
ing is “a rule of practice,” and as such may be subject to exception when
“weighty countervailing policies have been and are recognized.”108
Among the rights deemed sufficiently “weighty” to allow the Court in its
discretion to relax its standing rules are the penumbral First Amendment109
right to privacy and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.110
Following a line of cases in which the Court has allowed standing to assert the
rights of others, it seems that apart from requiring the constitutionally mandated
Article III “stake in the outcome,” the Court has exercised some flexibility in
defining the factors necessary to allow third-party standing.111
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court granted third-party
standing in the context of First Amendment privacy rights, and specifically in
the context of married persons and their right to use contraception.112  The
appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Con-
necticut and the doctor serving as the Medical Director of its New Haven
branch, were convicted as accessories in aiding and abetting the married per-
sons whom they counseled as to contraception and to whom they prescribed a
contraceptive device, despite the existence of a criminal statute prohibiting the
use of contraception.113  The Court used this case primarily as a vehicle to
expand on the idea that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras . . . creat[ing] zones of privacy.”114  To illustrate its point,115 the
Court enlisted the aid of the First Amendment with its inherent right of associa-
tion;116 the Third Amendment, prohibiting the nonconsensual quartering of
soldiers during peacetime;117 the Fourth Amendment with its guarantees
against unreasonable searches;118 the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause, which “enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment”;119 and the Ninth
107 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
108 Id. at 22.  The Court listed several examples of such “countervailing policies.”
109 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
111 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  The factors weighed by the Court in decid-
ing whether to allow third-party standing, although discussed to different degrees in the
above cases, include the impact of the challenged statute on the rights of the absent parties,
the relationship between the party before the court and the absent parties, and whether the
absent parties could raise the claim on their own behalf.
112 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
113 Id. at 480.
114 Id. at 484.
115 See id.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117 Id. amend. III.
118 Id. amend. IV.
119 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
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Amendment, specifying that certain rights are “retained by the people.”120  The
Court focused heavily on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ guarantees of
“protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home
and the privacies of life.’”121
The Court’s discussion of third-party standing was, in comparison, rather
cursory.  The Court mentioned the professional relationship between the appel-
lants and the married persons whose rights they assert, noted that the Article III
requirements are certainly met by a criminal conviction, and concluded that
“[t]he rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or
adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those
who have this kind of confidential relation to them.”122  However brief its dis-
cussion of standing, the Court clearly set forth two factors relevant to the ability
of a party to assert the rights of others:  the relationship between the parties and
the effect of the success or failure of the plaintiff’s claim on the rights of the
absent parties.123
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court revisited the contro-
versy surrounding the ability of a state to legislate morality.124  This time, the
defendant had directly violated a statute forbidding the furnishing of contracep-
tives by anyone other than a physician or pharmacist (pursuant to a valid pre-
scription, of course) to anyone other than a married person, when, during the
course of a lecture on contraception at Boston University, he not only exhibited
contraceptives, but also gave an unmarried woman a sample.125  The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction for exhibiting the con-
traceptive devices as a violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights but
upheld the conviction for having given away the contraceptive device.126
In challenging that conviction, the defendant raised the equal protection
claim of unmarried persons without access to contraception.127  Again, the
Court decided that this situation warranted a relaxation of its self-imposed
standing rules.128  However, the Court took great pains to assert that the rela-
tionship it found only seven years ago to be a crucial predicate to assert stand-
120 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
121 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting extensively from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)).
122 Id. at 481 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)).
123 Griswold represents the high water mark for the requirement of a specific relationship
between the claimant and the absent party, as in this case the relationship is of the most
personal, confidential nature of a doctor and his patient.  While in the preceding cases, there
had always been an underlying requirement that the absent party’s rights be adversely
affected should the claim not go forward, this requirement was most clearly stated here.
However, no mention was made of the ability of the absent parties to pursue their own
claims.  The second factor, the effect on the absent rightholder, presents the biggest obstacle
to framing a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing  in third-party standing terms, depend-
ing, of course, on how the Fourth Amendment interest is defined. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 260-61.
124 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
125 Id. at 440-42.
126 Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574 (Mass. 1969).
127 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
128 Id. at 444.
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ing, such as between a doctor and patient or accessory and principal, was no
longer necessary to assert another’s rights.129  In order to step away a bit (but
careful not to step back too far) from the extent of relationship required in
Griswold v. Connecticut,130 the Court framed the relationship between the par-
ties as “not simply the fortuitous connection between a vendor and potential
vendees, but the relationship between one who acted to protect the rights of a
minority and the minority itself.”131  Once again, standing “rules” gave way to
the Court’s normative judgment as to what can and cannot be properly
legislated.
One final demonstration of the Court’s less than rigid approach to third-
party standing can be seen in its willingness to relax the rules, not only for
“weighty” policy considerations, but as a matter of judicial convenience.  In a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute proscribing the sale of “nonintoxi-
cating” (3.2%) beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the
age of eighteen, the vendor of such beer was given standing to assert the equal
protection claim of males between the ages of eighteen and twenty in seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from the challenged statute.132  Although the
vendor had not been convicted nor even arrested, the fact that she was “subject
to sanctions and loss of license for violation of the statute,” on the one hand, or
economic injury for compliance on the other, gave her the requisite Article III
concreteness.133
A major factor considered by the Court in allowing the vendor standing
was the fact that her standing had not been challenged below and the constitu-
tional claim had already been considered.134  The Court reasoned that the main
purpose to deny third-party standing was to “minimize unwarranted interven-
tion into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill-
defined and speculative.”135  Because the court below had already considered
the constitutional challenge, the Court stated, “In such circumstances, a deci-
sion by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits in order to await
the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by injured third parties would be
impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise
of caution and prudence.”136  Thus, the primary consideration in granting
standing in this case was one of convenience and judicial expediency.  In addi-
tion, the Court mentioned that the statute’s prohibition on the sale of the beer
“leav[es] [the] vendor as the obvious claimant.”137
129 See id. at 445.
130 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
131 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445.
132 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-93 (1976).
133 Id. at 193-94.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 193.
136 Id. at 193-94.
137 Id. at 197.  The Court compared this statute to the one challenged in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).  However, in Eisenstadt, the Court had stated unequivocally that with-
out the threat of conviction, the absent unmarried persons had no forum in which to vindicate
their rights. Id. at 446.  Here, the Court backed down from this assertion, claiming only that
the defendant in Eisenstadt was “the least awkward challenger” to the statute. Craig, 429
U.S. at 197.  It is of interest to note that, at the onset of this case, one of the plaintiffs seeking
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In a vigorous and colorful dissent, Chief Justice Burger attacked the
Court’s apparent easing of the requirement of some specific relationship
between the litigant and the absent right-holder, remarking, “I cannot agree that
appellant . . . has standing arising from her status as a saloonkeeper to assert the
constitutional rights of her customers.”138  He went on to mention that this case
fit into none of the exceptions to the rule against third-party standing, and that
“there [was] here no barrier whatever to Oklahoma males 18-20 years of age
asserting, in an appropriate forum, any constitutional rights they may claim to
purchase 3.2% beer.”139  However, the crux of his argument rested on his con-
tention that “[i]t borders on the ludicrous to draw a parallel between a vendor of
beer and the intimate professional physician-patient relationship which under-
girded the relaxation of standing rules in [Griswold v. Connecticut].”140  Hav-
ing seen the flexibility and inconsistency of current standing doctrine, and the
relative ease with which the Court can maneuver within its own rules and limi-
tations to reach a particular substantive decision, we now turn to the Fourth
Amendment.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING:  FOURTH
AMENDMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
A. Standing in a Pre-Rakas World141
The Supreme Court first broached the issue of Fourth Amendment stand-
ing for purposes of analogy to certain sections of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934142 and held that those not parties to conversations that were ille-
gally intercepted in violation of the Act lacked standing to object to the use of
evidence and testimony gained as fruit of those conversations.143  In making its
analogy, the Court stated, “While this court has never been called upon to
declaratory and injunctive relief was indeed one of the adversely affected males, who subse-
quently lost his standing when the onset of time mooted his claim upon his twenty-first
birthday. Id. at 192.
138 Craig, 429 U.S. at 215 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 216 (noting the fact that plaintiff Craig had indeed litigated his rights until his
twenty-first birthday prevented him from continuing in the suit).
140 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).  The Chief Justice implied
that even though the relationship factor was a bit more relaxed in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
445, the Court there was careful to limit the exception to the third-party standing rule to
situations in which the relationship between the litigant and the third party was based on
something more than a mere vendor-potential vendee relationship, but between one who
championed the rights of some minority and that minority.
141 I begin my discussion with the Supreme Court’s consideration of Fourth Amendment
standing.  For a discussion of Fourth Amendment standing in the lower federal courts, see
Kuhns, supra note 8, at 493-94.  Professor Kuhns notes that “[a]lmost immediately” after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), establishing the
exclusionary rule for federal criminal prosecutions, lower federal courts responded by
developing standing requirements to limit the rule’s application.  Kuhns, supra note 8, at
493.
142 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (2000).  Very broadly, the relevant portions of the Act prohibit
the interception of communications, and any revelation of the information or contents
therein, and additionally forbid any person who has received such information to divulge or
use it for his or another’s benefit.
143 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
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decide the point, the federal courts in numerous cases, and with unanimity,
have denied standing to one not the victim of an unconstitutional search and
seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of that which was seized.”144
The dissent argued, however, that although the analogy to the Fourth
Amendment was imperfect,145 the lower court decisions relied on by the major-
ity were “hard to square with [the] statements by Mr. Justice Holmes”146 in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,147 continuing:  “It is evident that to
allow the Government to use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment against parties not victims of the unconstitutional search and
seizure is to allow the Government to profit by its wrong and to reduce in large
measure the protection of the Amendment.”148
Two years before Earl Warren was appointed as Chief Justice by President
Eisenhower, the Court had occasion to consider the issue of Fourth Amendment
standing directly.  In United States v. Jeffers,149 the Court held that the defen-
dant had standing to suppress the evidence of contraband narcotics seized in
conjunction with a search of a hotel room registered to the defendant’s two
aunts, based on his possessory interest in the contraband.150  The government
had conceded that the search of a hotel room was illegal as to the registered
occupants of that room but argued that the seizure of the defendant’s narcotics
did not violate any privacy right as to him.151  The Court firmly disagreed that
the search and the seizure could be so separated, stating that “they are bound
together by one sole purpose—to locate and seize the narcotics of respondent.
The search and seizure are, therefore, incapable of being untied.”152  In the
Court’s view, to hold that the government’s actions were legal as to the defen-
dant “would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was
designed to protect a fundamental right.”153  As to the government’s contention
that the defendant had no property right in contraband, the Court held, “Since
the evidence illegally seized was contraband the respondent was not entitled to
have it returned to him.  It being his property, for purposes of the exclusionary
144 Id. at 121 & n.12 (stating application of that principle in “at least fifty cases by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals in nine circuits and in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, not to mention many decisions by District Courts”).
145 Id. at 127-28 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the analogy to the Fourth Amend-
ment is not perfect because the act forbids “all interception, divulgence, or use,” as opposed
to the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of only unreasonable searches and seizures)
(emphasis added)).
146 Id. at 127.
147 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (“The essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”).
148 Goldstein, 316 U.S. at 127 n.4 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
149 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
150 The defendant had a key to the hotel room, as well as permission to make use of the
room, although not for purposes of storing narcotics, of which the aunts had no knowledge.
Id. at 50.
151 Id. at 51-52.
152 Id. at 52.
153 Id.
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rule, he was entitled on motion to have it suppressed as evidence on his
trial.”154
The Jeffers Court’s conception of Fourth Amendment rights was still quite
property-based, as compared to the Warren Court’s emphasis on privacy, exem-
plified many years later, of course, by Katz v. United States.155  That aside,
there are two important principles with regard to seizures that are particularly
worth noting:  first, the principle that if a defendant has standing to contest the
seizure based on her possession of the seized items, she has standing to contest
the underlying search that revealed those items, and second, the reiteration of
the principle that, for exclusionary rule purposes, one can have a possessory
interest sufficient to confer standing in contraband.  As I will later discuss, the
Burger Court chose to ignore the first principle and misstated the holding of
Jeffers in order to reach its desired result in United States v. Salvucci.156  How-
ever, as I will also illustrate, a result-oriented Court could have reached the
same result with less damage to the Fourth Amendment, at least from a theoret-
ical standpoint, had it overruled the second principle instead.157
We come now to 1960, a very good year for proponents of a broad con-
cept of Fourth Amendment standing.  The Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Frankfurter, one of the dissenters in Goldstein,158 introduced not one, not
two, but three theories under which a defendant can claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment if he fails to claim a possessory interest in either the place
searched or the items seized.159  The defendant in Jones v. United States
appealed from a conviction of two counts of federal narcotics violations, both
of which required proof of possession to establish guilt.160  The narcotics the
prosecution sought to use as evidence against the defendant were found as the
result of a search of the apartment in which the defendant was staying as a
guest.161
The Court began its analysis by looking for guidance within the frame-
work of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,162 which provided that a
154 Id. at 54.
155 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  Although Katz is often cited as the paradig-
matic case signaling the shift from a property-based to a privacy-based conception of the
Fourth Amendment, Professor Morgan Cloud argues that “Warden v. Hayden—not Katz—
was the opinion that actually shattered the link between property and Fourth Amendment
rights . . . .”  Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided:  How the Warren Court Dismantled
the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 35 (2005). Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967), abolished the “mere evidence” rule, see infra notes 275-77 and accompanying
text, and evidenced Justice Brennan’s view that the Fourth Amendment’s procedural require-
ments would provide sufficient protection for the Amendment’s substantive values.
156 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); see infra text accompanying notes 246-
51.
157 See infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
158 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 122 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
159 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
160 Id. at 258.
161 Id. at 259.  The defendant had testified that the apartment belonged to a friend who had
given him permission to stay there, had given him a key, and had been away from the
apartment for approximately five days, during which time the defendant had stayed there
“‘maybe a night.’” Id.
162 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
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person “aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court . . . for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence
anything so obtained . . . .”163  In defining who is in fact “aggrieved,” the Court
asserted that one who seeks to suppress evidence “must have been a victim of a
search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished
from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a
consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.”164  The italicized
language, quoted above and consisting of merely seven words, would become
the source for the “target theory” of standing, which was later characterized as
dicta and unequivocally dismissed by the Rakas Court.165
However one characterizes the “target” language, there is no question that
the Jones Court produced two bona fide holdings in its disposition of the stand-
ing issue, giving birth to both the “automatic standing” rule166 and the “legiti-
mately on premises” doctrine.167  Turning to automatic standing, the Court
affirmed the rule established by the circuit courts:  to demonstrate standing, a
“movant [must] claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or
to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.”168  The
Court recognized that when possession is an element of the crime charged, to
require compliance with the usual standing rules would place the defendant in
the dilemma of having to admit to the very facts that would secure his convic-
tion.169  In addition, the state would essentially be tossing a double-headed
coin, denying the defendant’s possession of the seized item to maintain the
legality of the search, or at least to prevent the suppression of the evidence at
trial, while asserting that very possession to garner the conviction.170  These
two concerns prompted the Court to create the doctrine of automatic standing:
“The same element in this prosecution which has caused a dilemma, i.e., that
possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for a
preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property
seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged.”171
In announcing the “legitimately on premises” test, the Jones Court sought
to broaden the class of people who could claim a requisite interest in the
invaded place by eliminating a hierarchy of types of possessors that would
ensure standing for some, but not for others:
163 Jones, 362 U.S. at 260.
164 Id. at 261 (emphasis added).  The Jones Court, thus, also adopted an individualistic view
of the Fourth Amendment, although a much broader one than the Burger Court would
embrace.  In addition, the Jones Court characterized the search as an “invasion of privacy,”
id., but fostered an expansive conception of privacy when determining who and under what
circumstances one could allege such an invasion.
165 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1978); see infra notes 204-07 and accompany-
ing text.
166 Jones, 362 U.S. at 263.
167 Id. at 267.  (“No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on prem-
ises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when
its fruits are proposed to be used against him.”).
168 Id. at 261.
169 Id. at 261-62.
170 Id. at 263.
171 Id.
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We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the
law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving
the body of private property law . . . .  Distinctions such as those between “lessee,”
“licensee,” “invitee” and “guest,” often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards.172
The “legitimately on premises” test has been critiqued both by members of
the Court and the legal academy as too broad to be the proper measure of
standing.173  If asked to perform the dual functions of gatekeeper and ultimate
arbiter, and taken to its literal limit, as in hypotheticals involving janitors174
and casual visitors in kitchens while basements are being ransacked,175 it prob-
ably is.176  What, then, has been perceived as one of the benefits of the “legiti-
mately on premises” test, that it seems to offer a bright-line rule that will be
simple for courts to administer,177 turns out also to be its primary weakness, in
that when mechanistically applied, it can lead to extreme results.  However, as I
will further develop in my discussion of Rakas, the majority opinion in that
case simply discarded the test based on its literal meaning, although it bemoans
the same literal application of the phrase by the lower courts, rather than
searching for some meaning beyond the surface.178
172 Id. at 266.
173 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 375 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]his
sweeping dictum is taken somewhat out of context and cannot possibly have the literal
meaning attributed to it.”).  The Court, in Rakas, of course, overruled that basis for standing.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (“Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase ‘legiti-
mately on premises’ coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth
Amendment rights.”); see also, e.g., Simien, supra note 8, at 551 (“However, ‘legitimately
on the premises’ too broadly defines the requisite relationship [to the premises].”).
174 Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 375-76 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[W]ould that dictum enable a
janitor to escape the use of evidence illegally seized from his boss?”).
175 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 (“For example, applied literally, this statement would permit a
casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of another’s house
to object to a search of the basement if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house
at the time of the search.”).
176 Although, as Professor Daniel B. Yeager points out, the janitor and casual guest alike
have a relationship with the searched premises.  Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the
Positive Law:  Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 249, 290 (1993).  As I will develop further, the key to the viability of this test
is to engage in a careful inquiry as to the extent of the legitimacy of the presence. See infra
notes 286-93 and accompanying text.  However, rather than replacing this test with just such
an inquiry, the Rakas Court reinstated the hierarchies the Jones Court sought to eliminate,
except the Court now distinguishes between classes of nontrespassers when deciding who is
worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. See Yeager, supra, at 288-91; see also infra note
225.
177 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 168 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Jones rule is relatively easily
applied by police and courts; the rule announced today will not provide law enforcement
officials with a bright line between the protected and the unprotected.”).  As Justice Rehn-
quist pointed out in response, however, the decisions purporting to apply this bright-line test
have been anything but consistent. Id. at 145 n.13 (majority opinion).
178 Id. at 142 n.10 (“Unfortunately, with few exceptions, lower courts have literally applied
this language from Jones and have held that anyone legitimately on premises at the time of
the search may contest its legality.”); see discussion infra Part V.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 26  1-APR-08 12:39
Winter 2008] DEMISE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING 595
Approximately twenty years later, Jones was emphatically overruled with
the Burger Court eradicating both of its (undisputed) holdings through its deci-
sions in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci.  Of course, a few things happened in
between.  The first nail in the coffin of automatic standing came in 1968, with
the Court’s decision in Simmons v. United States.179  The Simmons Court rec-
ognized and alleviated the dilemma at the heart of the justification for auto-
matic standing, and while the predicament facing one charged with a
possessory crime is most obvious, the defendant charged with a nonpossessory
crime faces a similar one in that the “[t]estimony . . . which links a defendant to
evidence which the Government considers important enough to seize and to
seek to have admitted at trial, must often be highly prejudicial . . . .”180  Thus,
“a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible against him at
trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of stand-
ing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.”181  The Court framed this
as an impermissible Hobson’s choice between the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and those of the Fifth182:
Thus, in this case [defendant] was obliged either to give up what he believed, with
advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  In these circumstances, we
find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order
to assert another.  We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a
motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection.183
Before the Court was to deliver the next blow to automatic standing, it
emphatically reiterated its principles on Fourth Amendment standing in gen-
eral.184  In Alderman, the Fourth Amendment violation occurred by virtue of
the government’s unauthorized electronic surveillance of one codefendant’s
premises.185  Neither of the two defendants was a participant in the illegally
recorded conversations (which, had they been, would have been sufficient to
establish standing), but the Court nevertheless granted standing to the owner of
179 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).  The Court’s decision in Simmons pro-
vided one justification for the abolition of the automatic standing rule in United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1980).
180 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 391.
181 Id. at 392-93.  The Court discussed lower court opinions supporting that a defendant’s
testimony during a suppression hearing is admissible at trial should the motion to suppress
fail, but left open the possibility that testimony could be admitted even should the motion
succeed.
182 The lower courts, in permitting the testimony to be admitted, reasoned that there was in
fact no Fifth Amendment violation because the defendant was not “compelled” to testify.
However, the Court pointed out that the implied choice is between testifying or “giv[ing] up
the benefit.” Id. at 393-94.
183 Id. at 394.
184 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
185 Id. at 167-69.
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the premises.186  The Court equated the recorded conversations with “tangible
property,” analogizing that
[i]f the police make an unwarranted search of a house and seize tangible property
belonging to third parties—even a transcript of a third-party conversation—the
homeowner may object to its use against him, not because he had any interest in the
seized items as “effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment, but because they were
the fruits of an unauthorized search of his house, which is itself expressly protected
by the Fourth amendment.187
The Court refused, however, to extend the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to include in its reach a codefendant whose own Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated, restating “[t]he established principle . . . that
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be success-
fully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by
those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.”188
Thus, even after Katz, the Court still exhibited a great deal of deference to
property rights.  Too much so for Justice Harlan, in fact, who dissented as to
the Court’s decision to grant standing to the homeowner, stating that “the right
to conversational privacy is a personal right, not a property right.  It follows
from this that the Court’s rule permits property owners to assert vicariously the
personal rights of others.  Indeed, granting standing to property owners com-
promises the personal privacy of others.”189
Despite Justice Harlan’s argument that conversations are not tangible
items, the Court chose to see them in this light, emphatically stating that Katz
held that “the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s private conversations as
well as his private premises . . . .”190  Thus, at the time Alderman was decided,
the Fourth Amendment clearly protected owners of both premises and effects
(including conversations).  While the Burger Court did retain the protection for
owners of premises, in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci, it nonetheless departed
sharply from the established rule by denying the same protection to owners of
seized effects.
However, even in that departure, the Burger Court, in Rakas, took note of,
and relied on, several concepts articulated in Alderman for support.  First,
Alderman asserted that Fourth Amendment rights are personal.191  Second,
Alderman rejected any justification for allowing third-party standing in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment, although it framed its rejection in terms of the
desirability of applying the exclusionary rule:
186 Id. at 176-80.  “Such [Fourth Amendment] violation would occur if the United States
unlawfully overheard conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his
premises, whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations.” Id. at 176.
187 Id. at 176-77.
188 Id. at 171-72.
189 Id. at 194 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  For Justice Harlan, conversations are not akin to
tangible effects that often are or must be, by their nature, left inside the home, thus justifying
a strong protection for the premises in order to protect the privacy of the items kept there.
Id. at 194-95.  Going further, in fact, Justice Harlan urged that the Court should “reject
traditional property concepts entirely.” Id. at 191.
190 Id. at 178 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
191 Id. at 174; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
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There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect
the rights of another.  No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when
the evidence is offered against some other party.  The victim can and very probably
will object for himself when and if it becomes important for him to do so.192
The Rakas Court also reiterated Alderman’s position that not everything that
deters Fourth Amendment violations is constitutionally required, and that, on
balance, the Court remained “[un]convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime
and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.”193
Finally, there is another important idea expressed in Alderman that the
Burger Court may well have taken note of, but did not repeat in its Rakas
decision:  “Of course, Congress or state legislatures may extend the exclusion-
ary rule and provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against any-
one for any purpose.”194  In fact, far from simply not repeating this invitation to
Congress, the Rakas Court rescinded it and cancelled the party.  While it is true
that state courts may interpret their state constitutional provisions more expan-
sively than the Court has chosen to interpret the corresponding federal provi-
sions, Congress may not, even under its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5,
enforcement powers,195 interpret a constitutional provision more generously
than its coequal branch, the judiciary, has.196  Thus, by merging standing with
substance, the Court has virtually shut the door on any congressional expansion
of the exclusionary rule, although, theoretically, Congress remains perfectly
free to abolish the rule entirely.
B. Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci:  Standing No More
In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court, in an opinion authored by then Justice
Rehnquist, held that passengers in an automobile had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the place searched and, thus, were not permitted to contest the
search that revealed a box of rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle, in which they
failed to claim ownership and which were hidden, respectively, in the locked
glove compartment and beneath the front passenger seat.197  In reaching this
decision, the Court made three major pronouncements:  it repudiated the “tar-
get” theory as well as the “legitimately on premises” test, both derived from
Jones,198 and also eliminated standing as an independent preliminary inquiry,
192 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174; see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134.
193 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75; see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137.
194 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 175.
195 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
196 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“Congress does not enforce a consti-
tutional right by changing what the right is.  It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.  Were it not so, what Con-
gress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the ‘provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment].’”) (alteration in original)).
197 Rakas, 439 U.S. 128.
198 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960); see also supra text accompanying
notes 164-72.
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finding it more properly subsumed by the substantive Fourth Amendment
analysis.
To begin, the Court emphasized its conception of the personal nature of
Fourth Amendment rights, as supported by Alderman.199  The Court’s choice
of words, however, is interesting to note and illustrates the tension between a
regulatory and individualistic view of the Fourth Amendment:  “A person who
is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property
has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”200  I find it awk-
ward, at least linguistically, if not logically, that one can be aggrieved by a
search and seizure that violates the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and
yet is not aggrieved for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.201
Next, the Court subtly shifted the focus of the exclusionary rule away
from its deterrent purpose and towards a remedial view, stating that “since the
exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated to benefit from the rule’s protections.”202  With the
exclusionary rule now sounding more in remedy than in general deterrence, the
Court has even stronger justification for the personal-right view of the Fourth
Amendment that it seeks to enforce vigorously.203
Turning now to its task of dispensing with the target theory, the Court
addressed the phrase “‘one against whom the search was directed,’”204 and
characterized it “merely as a parenthetical equivalent of the previous phrase ‘a
victim of a search or seizure.’”205  Again, it strikes me as awkward to say that
the target of a search is the equivalent of the victim of the search or seizure but
not for purposes of standing.  But it matters not, in any case, because the Court
tells us next that this language, however it is read, is only dicta.206  After all,
had the Jones Court really meant that language to be an independent ground for
standing, it would not have needed any, let alone two, additional holdings.207
But why stop there?  Why did the Jones Court supply two alternate grounds for
199 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34.
200 Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
201 This language is adapted from Alderman, but the original formulation avoids the linguis-
tic awkwardness I identify in the Rakas version. See supra text accompanying note 188.
202 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 (citation omitted).
203 Many scholars have outlined the various justifications for the exclusionary rule, as well
as its evolution, from its origins in common law property actions, such as replevin, with a
focus on the return of seized items to the rightful possessor, through its role as a guardian of
judicial integrity, and, most recently, as a deterrent device, with an emphasis on suppression,
rather than return, of seized property. See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 8, at 273-80; Yeager,
supra note 176, at 272-76.
204 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134-35 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960)).
205 Id. at 135 (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 261).
206 Id.
207 Id.  Justice Black made a similar argument in his dissenting opinion in Mancusi, arguing
that had the Court truly believed that being “legitimately on [the] premises” was a sufficient
prerequisite for standing, it would not have needed any discussion of reasonable expectations
or other limiting factors to decide that the defendant did in fact have standing.  Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 376 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
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standing?  Perhaps the Jones Court was itself guilty of a little activism by
deciding more than was absolutely necessary to dispose of the case before it!
The Court made short work of repudiating the target theory, focusing on
the administrative difficulties involved in determining who is actually the target
of a search,208 and simply concluding, without any real discussion of why, that
the target theory allows a defendant to “assert a violation, not of his own con-
stitutional rights but of someone else’s . . . .”209  In reaching its conclusion, the
Court reflected on the cost of the exclusionary rule and asserted the propriety of
considering this cost when deciding whether to expand standing, and conse-
quently, the incidence of exclusion.210  Imagine for a moment, however, that
the Court instead had announced, “We have generally held that one whose
Fourth Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence
obtained as a consequence of such a violation.  However, we think it entirely
proper to consider the substantial social cost extracted by this judicially created
remedy, which we have determined to be the only effective deterrent of Fourth
Amendment violations, when we interpret and define the meaning of the
Amendment.”  One might think this an entirely improper line of reasoning, and
Justice White most certainly thought so.211  But that is, in essence, what the
Court proceeded to do (without an announcement, that is).
Having repudiated the target theory, and reiterated its personal-right view
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court indicated that “the question necessarily
arises whether it serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle
a matter of standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment claim.”212  The Court, obviously, answered this question in the nega-
tive.213  But, did that question necessarily arise?  Or, did the Court have
something more in mind than it let on?  The Court underplayed the impact of
this shift, indicating that the inquiry is the same and “will produce no additional
208 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 136-37.  I would think, however, that it shouldn’t be much more
difficult for a judge to determine the target of a search than it is for a magistrate to determine
whether a police officer has probable cause when he is seeking a warrant, unless, the real
concern is police perjury.  Oddly enough, if the target theory were to be adopted, with noth-
ing more, a police officer would have the incentive to maintain at a suppression hearing that
the defendant was not the target of the search, or, that the officer, in conducting the search,
had no reason to suspect that he would find evidence against the defendant.  This seems a
perverse result, when one of the primary (if not the primary) objects of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to curb officers’ discretion and prevent random searches by ensuring that all searches
are based on probable cause, as determined by a magistrate in advance of the search.
209 Id. at 137.
210 Id. at 137-38 (“Since our cases generally have held that one whose Fourth Amendment
rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence obtained in the course of an illegal
search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who may
invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding whether to expand standing to assert
Fourth Amendment violations.”).
211 See id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) (“If the Court is troubled by the practical impact of
the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule’s continued validity squarely
instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct
results in specific cases.”).
212 Id. at 138-39 (majority opinion).
213 Id. at 139  (“But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a
particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically
separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.”).
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situations in which evidence must be excluded.”214  Nonetheless, might there
not be some benefit to retaining the concept of standing?  After all, as long as
Article III’s requirements are satisfied, has the Court not, in the past, granted
standing to third parties in certain contexts?  Might it not, should the proper
circumstances arise, be persuaded to do so in the context of the Fourth Amend-
ment as well?
The Court did acknowledge its past decisions regarding standing in gen-
eral, and the traditional inquiries of whether there is an “injury in fact” and
whether the claimant is pressing his own rights, or those of another.215  Perhaps
mindful that the latter inquiry has prudential rather than constitutional implica-
tions, and that as such, is subject, albeit infrequently, to exception, the Court
made sure to quickly dismiss this possibility, indicating that “this Court’s long
history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has
already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries . . . .”216  The
Court may have well continued, “so there is no need to revisit them again.
(Ever.)”217
Coming to the substantive Fourth Amendment inquiry, the Rakas opinion
attacked not the Jones doctrine of automatic standing, but the language of its
alternative holding, that one who is “legitimately on premises” where a search
occurs has standing to object to that search.218  The Rakas majority limited the
application of that phrase to the facts of Jones, and to the “unremarkable pro-
position that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than
his own home” so as to be protected by the guarantees of the Fourth Amend-
ment against “unreasonable governmental intrusion.”219  Ironically, the Rakas
Court used a concept that was initially designed to broaden the scope of the
Fourth Amendment’s protection effectively to narrow it.  The Court, citing to
Katz, stated that the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the invaded place.”220
214 Id.  The Court fails to make the same claim, however, with regard to additional situa-
tions in which evidence might be included.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 140.
217 The dissent does not mention the collapse of standing into substance.  Justice White’s
primary focus is on advocating for the retention of the “legitimately on premises” test and on
critiquing the majority’s return to a property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment,
despite its reliance on expectations of privacy.  However, three sentences in the dissenting
opinion come closest to questioning the elimination of the standing inquiry:
At most, one could say that perhaps the Constitution provides some degree less protection for the
personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion when one does not have a posses-
sory interest in the invaded private place.  But that would only change the extent of the protec-
tion; it would not free police to do the unreasonable, as does the decision today.  And since the
accused should be entitled to litigate the application of the Fourth Amendment where his privacy
interest is merely arguable, the failure to allow such litigation here is the more incomprehensible.
Id. at 166 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
218 See id. at 142-43 (majority opinion).
219 Id. at 142.
220 Id. at 143. Katz, deciding the constitutionality of electronic surveillance of conversa-
tions held in a telephone booth, did not actually adopt the phrase, “legitimate expectation of
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The bulk of the substantive discussion, however, revolved around the
Court’s repudiation of the “legitimately on premises” test as being too broad.
To illustrate how this test, formalistically applied, would permit standing to
those who would not necessarily have a legitimate privacy interest in the area
searched, the Court enlisted the assistance of a (fictional) casual visitor, present
in the kitchen during a search of the basement she has never visited, and the
(equally fictional) casual visitor arriving exactly one minute prior to, and
departing exactly one minute after, a search.221  The only argument from the
dissent that the majority counters to any significant degree is the dissent’s con-
tention that in substituting the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test for the
“legitimately on premises” test, the Court substituted an easily applied, bright-
line test for an indeterminate standard.222  The majority, instead, characterized
the “legitimately on premises” test as “simply a label” placed on decisions that
have not been thoroughly analyzed.223
Yet, the majority’s chosen standard is in reality no less of a label.  For, as
Justice White admonished,224 while the majority declared the appropriate test,
it never offered, in applying it, any hint of what, short of ownership, might
actually legitimate an expectation of privacy.  Nor did the majority ever explain
why the passengers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
friend’s car, other than on its say so.  After all, they seemed to do as much, if
not more, to maintain privacy in their friend’s car as Mr. Katz did in the public
phone booth.  Perhaps the real difference is between conversations and sawed-
privacy,” but reasoned as the basis of its holding that the defendant, in using a public tele-
phone, expected “that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to
the world.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).  Thus, the Court expanded the
protective scope of the Amendment, by holding that the expectation of privacy, even without
the generally requisite property right in the place searched, would trigger Fourth Amendment
protection.  The Court in Katz also expanded the notion of personal property, by including
conversations as property that could be seized under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 353.
The majority, I think, would have been shocked by the notion that its broad understanding of
the importance of a defendant’s expectation of privacy from the uninvited ears and eyes of
the government would be used to eradicate the concrete protections provided to the “houses”
and “effects” of the Fourth Amendment.  Justice Black, in a sharp dissent, criticized what he
felt was the majority’s distortion of the Amendment’s words:  “Thus, by arbitrarily substitut-
ing the Court’s language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution’s language,
designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the
Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend
the Court’s broadest concept of privacy.” Id. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).  Black stated
vehemently that it was not the Court’s purpose to keep the Constitution in step with “the
times,” which would make the Court a “continuously functioning constitutional convention,”
and further expressed his hope that “[w]ith this decision[,] the Court ha[d] completed . . . its
rewriting of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” Id.  Indeed, it seems that the Court was nowhere
near finished.
221 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 (“The first visitor would have absolutely no interest or
legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement, the second would have none in the house,
and it advances no purpose served by the Fourth Amendment to permit either of them to
object to the lawfulness of the search.”).
222 The majority points to “widely varying” results in the lower courts trying to apply the
“legitimately on premises” test. Id. at 145 n.13.
223 Id. at 148.
224 Id. at 165 (White, J., dissenting).
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off rifles.  Or perhaps it has more to do with the nature of automobiles and the
already diminished expectation of privacy associated with motor vehicles.225
The Court maintained, however, that the defendants’ claim would fail
even had the search occurred in a house,
since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely
passengers.  Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger
qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of
privacy.226
What the Court failed to note, however, is that, unlike the hypothetical kitchen
guest who has never stepped foot in the basement, it is likely, or at least possi-
ble, that it was the front-seat passenger and not the owner/driver who, as the
group hastily (I would imagine) dove into their getaway car after having just
committed a robbery, actually placed the incriminating items safely out of
sight, in the glove compartment and under the front seat.  And, unlike our
kitchen guest, each passenger in that automobile knew what was hidden in
those areas, and hoped, if not expected, that those items would remain so.
Summing up its holding as to the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence
seized from the car in which they were simply passengers, the Court made the
following statements:
Judged by the foregoing analysis, petitioners’ claims must fail.  They asserted neither
a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property
seized.  And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were “legitimately on
[the] premises” . . . is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched.227
225 Although, I do not believe that a Court could justify not permitting automobile passen-
gers to have standing by finding that passengers have a lesser expectation of privacy than
owners, and since owners already have a diminished expectation, passengers simply have
none.  It seems, at least for now, that once a class of persons, be it owners or guests, is
determined to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area, be it in a home or in a car,
such as to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, one does not make further distinctions
between the owner and the guest for purposes of applying that protection.  While, to this
point, a diminished (rather than nonexistent) expectation of privacy has not actually turned a
search into a non-search, it has become a factor when the Court balances the nature of the
privacy interest with the extent of the intrusion in order to relax the Amendment’s require-
ments. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (holding warrantless regula-
tory search of firearms dealer permissible due in part to a diminished expectation of privacy
when one engages in a highly regulated industry).  Thus, one further danger of collapsing
standing with substance is that, while the Court now has created a hierarchy of privacy
interests and classes of nontrespassers (for example, guests conducting business, see Minne-
sota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), versus overnight guests, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91 (1990)), the Court could conceivably create classes of “legitimate expectation of
privacy” holders, in the substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, to permit certain conduct
towards an overnight guest, for example, that would not be permitted towards the owner of
the home.  While a Court could do this even leaving the standing inquiry intact, it seems
somehow more awkward to say that one individual has “less” standing than another (one
either does or does not have standing), or that although two individuals have standing to
contest the same search and seizure, they will be treated differently.
226 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49.
227 Id. at 148 (alteration in original).
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On my reading, the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test is a second level
test, applicable if a defendant has failed to assert either the property or posses-
sory interest in the place searched, or such similar interest in the item(s) seized,
that had been formerly thought sufficient (and necessary, prior to Katz) to trig-
ger Fourth Amendment protections (or standing, in Alderman terms).  As I can
see, nowhere in the Rakas holding did the Court state that a possessory interest
in the property seized, in and of itself, would not entitle the defendant to claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.  In fact, relegated to a footnote after
its discussion illustrating, by example, how attenuated the privacy interests of
certain visitors to a property can be, the Court stated, “This is not to say that
such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the
search if their own property were seized during the search.”228
However, two years later, the Court, with twenty/forty hindsight, appar-
ently saw something that I could not.  I rest my understanding of Rakas, and
my conclusion that the Court’s opinions in Rawlings v. Kentucky229 and United
States v. Salvucci230 misstated, or at the very least overstated, the Rakas hold-
ing, on my own vision.  However, I acknowledge that the reader may well be
inclined to accept the interpretation provided by then Justice Rehnquist, as he
authored all three opinions. In Rawlings, one of two Fourth Amendment cases
decided on the same day, the Court held that a defendant was not entitled to
challenge the validity of the search that revealed the drugs, to which he claimed
ownership, in another’s purse because he lacked a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the searched purse.231  The Court enlisted the aid of Rakas, holding
that “[w]hile petitioner’s ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be
considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that ‘arcane’
concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of
228 Id. at 142 n.11.  Professor Christopher Slobogin argues that the Rakas Court may have
actually left open the question of whether legitimate presence coupled with a possessory
interest in the seized item would have been sufficient to confer standing on the passengers,
which would mean that possessory interest in the seized effect, while not determinative of
standing, is at the very least not irrelevant. See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 405.
229 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
230 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
231 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.  The Court used a hypothetical example of a defendant
placing his drugs in plain view to illustrate that, although he would certainly still have own-
ership of the drugs, there would be no “legitimate expectation of privacy” and no Fourth
Amendment violation.  This analogy is flawed, as plain view is an established exception to
the warrant requirement.  Certainly one cannot expect an officer to turn a blind eye to what
she sees directly in front of her through no effort of her own.  This is not quite the same as an
officer searching one party illegally, and then claiming what she found to have been in plain
view as to another party.  Recall, that when one places something in plain view, the thought
is that one “knowingly exposes” the item to the public, including the police. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  Yes, the defendant in the hypothetical would prob-
ably lose on the merits—if the officer had probable cause to believe that the items seized
were, in fact, contraband.  Thus, there is still more to the merits determination than simply
whether one places an item in plain view and thus cannot maintain an expectation of privacy.
See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 16-17 (illustrating, by example, the fallacy of the Rakas plain
view example, in that the seizure of items in plain view may not violate privacy rights, but
may nonetheless be unlawful); see also Slobogin, supra note 8, at 414 (noting that the Court,
in Rakas and Rawlings, “fail[ed] to differentiate between searches and seizures” when dis-
missing traditional property concepts as “arcane”).
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the Fourth Amendment.”  This seems a bit like adding insult to irony, for while
Rakas did indeed mention “arcane” property classifications, it was clearly in
the context of the location searched, and not of the property seized.232  Further,
the Rakas Court’s use of the argument was cited from Jones’s use to expand
defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, where the “arcane” property distinctions
of “gossamer strength” were those “between ‘lessee,’ ‘licensee,’ ‘invitee’ and
‘guest.’”233  Professor Albert Alschuler notes this irony as well:
Rakas had emphasized the defendants’ failure to allege ownership of the property
seized, and it had said that an owner of property would “in all likelihood” have
standing to challenge its search or seizure “by virtue of [his] right to exclude.”
Accordingly, the defendant in Rawlings said to the Supreme Court, “I am the owner.”
And the Court responded, “Mr. Rawlings, don’t be arcane.”234
And so, in the space of a few sentences, the Rawlings Court “cavalierly
reject[ed] the fundamental principle, unquestioned until [that day], that an inter-
est in either the place searched or the property seized is sufficient to invoke the
Constitution’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.”235
With “effects” now virtually erased from the Fourth Amendment, the
Court, in Salvucci,236 was free to move on to the doctrine of automatic standing
(all in a day’s work).  To accomplish this, the Court relied on its holding in
Simmons v. United States,237 as well as that day’s holding in Rawlings, based
on its purported support from Rakas.  The Court first set forth the two reasons
for which the doctrine of automatic standing was created and then stated why
those reasons were no longer applicable.238
The first concern of the Jones Court, “that a defendant charged with a
possessory offense might only be able to establish his standing to challenge a
search and seizure by giving self-incriminating testimony admissible as evi-
dence of his guilt,” was all but mooted by the Court’s decision in Simmons,
which held that the testimony given by a defendant in a suppression hearing
could not be admitted as evidence against him at trial.239  However, the
232 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (“In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view
expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in property
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control.”).
233 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1960).
234 Alschuler, supra note 8, at 15 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
235 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall’s dissent quite
effectively exposes the weaknesses in the majority opinion, in particular in its reliance on
Rakas:
The Court’s examination of previous Fourth Amendment cases begins and ends—as it must if it
is to reach its desired conclusion—with Rakas v. Illinois.  Contrary to the Court’s assertion,
however, Rakas did not establish that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures only if they have a privacy interest in the place searched.  The
question before the Court in Rakas was whether the defendants could establish their right to
Fourth Amendment protection simply by showing that they were “legitimately on [the] prem-
ises” searched.
Id. at 114-15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
236 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86 (1980).
237 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
238 Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 87-88.
239 Id. at 89-90; see supra text accompanying notes 179-83.  The Court correctly stated that
in some ways, Simmons offered broader protection than Jones, in that its “use immunity”
extended to all cases and not just those involving possessory crimes.
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Salvucci Court made no determination as to whether a prosecutor could use a
defendant’s suppression hearing testimony to impeach him should he decide to
testify at his trial as well, finding that to be “an issue which more aptly relates
to the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for retaining
automatic standing.”240
The second justification for Jones’s adoption of automatic standing was in
precluding the government from taking “‘advantage of contradictory posi-
tions’”241 by “assert[ing] that the defendant possessed the goods for purposes
of criminal liability, while simultaneously asserting that he did not possess
them for the purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”242  Twenty years later, the Court stated that interim decisions, particu-
larly Rakas,
clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant
criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to Fourth Amendment dep-
rivation, without legal contradiction.  To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-
contradiction in Jones, the Court necessarily relied on the unexamined assumption
that a defendant’s possession of a seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpa-
bility was also sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment “standing.”  This assump-
tion, however, even if correct at the time, is no longer so.243
Although the issue of the continued validity of the automatic standing doc-
trine was not before the Court in Rakas, that Court, in a footnote, stated that
“[s]uch a rule is, of course, one which may allow a defendant to assert the
Fourth Amendment rights of another.”244  The Jones Court most certainly
would have disagreed with this assertion, relying instead on the principle that
one’s “effects” are entitled to as much protection as the space searched (per-
haps “examining” the language of the Amendment itself), regardless of whether
possession of the seized effect is an element of the charge or not.  While auto-
matic standing was applied in prosecutions involving possessory offenses only,
the underlying premise of the automatic standing doctrine is that possession of
any seized item is always sufficient to establish standing to claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment.  However, when the government has already taken
the trouble to claim that possession on the defendant’s “behalf” through its
charge, it “eliminates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in
the premises searched or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when
standing is challenged.”245
The Salvucci Court, in a footnote, also disagreed with the defendant’s reli-
ance on United States v. Jeffers246 for support of the idea that ownership of
seized items conferred Fourth Amendment standing.247  The Court cited to
240 Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 93-94.  The Court cited to the decisions of numerous courts hold-
ing that the prosecution may indeed use such testimony for impeachment purposes in the
main trial. See id. at 93 n.8.
241 Id. at 88 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263 (1960)).
242 Id. at 88.
243 Id. at 90.
244 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135 n.4 (1978).
245 Jones, 362 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
116-17 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
246 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
247 Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 90 n.5.
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Rakas, rather than reexamining Jeffers directly, and declared (quite correctly)
that “[i]n Rakas . . . we stated that ‘[s]tanding in Jeffers was based on Jeffers’
possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized.’”248
However, in Rakas, the Court discussed Jeffers in its repudiation of the target
theory, indicating simply its post hoc interpretation of the facts, and did not
make any unequivocal statements that in order to claim a Fourth Amendment
violation, a defendant would indeed be required to sustain both such inter-
ests.249  In fact, on my reading, Jeffers proposed the exact opposite.  While it is
true that the record in Jeffers could have supported a finding that the defendant
had a substantial possessory interest in the place searched,250 the Court made
no such finding, and indeed no such finding was necessary.251
While the Court in Salvucci did correctly state the holding of its sibling
decision in Rawlings that “legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for
determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment interest, for it does
not invariably represent the protected Fourth Amendment interest,”252 its state-
ment of the Rakas holding was less than accurate.253  The Court proposed that
Rakas held “that an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have ‘a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’”254  Read narrowly,
and in my view correctly, Rakas held that being “legitimately on the premises”
in the absence of other factors (such as a ownership of premises searched or
property seized) is not sufficient grounds for claiming a violation of one’s
Fourth Amendment rights and that a claimant must at the very least demon-
strate “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”255  Not only
did Rakas explicitly leave open the possibility that possession of the seized
goods would be sufficient to confer standing,256 but, as Justice Marshall
pointed out, because the defendants in Rakas never acknowledged ownership
of the seized goods for purposes of claiming the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, that issue was not before the Court, “and, consequently, the Court
did not and could not have decided whether such a claim could be main-
248 Id. at 91 n.5 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 136).  The Court
did state that under certain conditions, a defendant would be able to petition for return of
property on the basis of ownership “if the seizure, as opposed to the search, was illegal.” Id.
at n.6.
249 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 135-36.
250 See supra note 150.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.  One could actually read the Court’s holding
that the search and seizure could not be separated as conceding, at least arguendo, that Mr.
Jeffers did not have a sufficient interest in the searched premises.  Professor Slobogin, how-
ever, suggests that the Court’s treatment of Jeffers in Rakas and Rawlings demonstrates that
the Court would be willing to recognize standing in the event that a defendant “can show
previous, continuing access to the searched area and a possessory interest in the seized
item.” See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 405.  I still maintain, however, that the Rakas opinion,
rather than stating what Jeffers actually held, indicates what Jeffers would have held had it
been decided in 1978.
252 Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91.
253 See id. at 91-92.
254 Id. (emphasis added).
255 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
256 Id. at 142 n.11.
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tained.”257  Indeed, to do so would have been engaging in activism!  Neverthe-
less, whatever the accurate reading of Rakas, the holding of Rawlings made it
clear that in the Court’s view, at least, possession or even ownership of the
seized item was not enough to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
and thus the second justification for Jones’s automatic standing rule crumbled.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE (OR TWO OR THREE)
Although the primary focus of this Article is the annexation of standing
into the substantive Fourth Amendment determination, and the repercussions of
this maneuver, I thought I might sketch out a few alternatives to the current
standing doctrine.258  I begin with an approach to standing that would classify
the standing of defendants such as those in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci in
terms of third parties.  While I actually believe that all of those defendants had
a first-party claim,259 the Court has not chosen to acknowledge a more collec-
tive view of the Fourth Amendment that would permit, indeed require, such
defendants to have standing in their own right.  Although, as a matter of pru-
dential standing, a Court can permit third-party standing in certain circum-
stances (as we have seen),260 it is slightly problematic to fit Fourth Amendment
standing into the third-party mold.  However flexible it seems the Court may
have been with the factors used in its determinations (most notably in the
strength of relationship between the parties or in the ability of the third party to
press its own claim), it seems that a constant requirement has been a direct
effect on the rights of the absent third party should the court refuse to adjudi-
cate the “plaintiff’s” claim.  It would seem an almost Herculean task for a
defendant to show how the absent party, against whom there is no criminal
prosecution, would benefit directly from the adjudication of his Fourth Amend-
ment violation as it affects the party who is in fact being prosecuted.
It is difficult to see the benefit to the third party, that is, if one has an
“atomistic” rather than regulatory view of the Fourth Amendment.261  If, how-
ever, the Court were to embrace the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule
wholly, yes, even when making standing determinations, then third (and fourth
and fifth) parties would benefit when the rule is vigorously applied and future
police misconduct is more fully deterred.  In fact, if the exclusionary rule is
viewed solely as a deterrent, and not as a remedy to compensate the victim of
an unlawful search or seizure (and it must be seen this way if the “good faith”
exception has any justification), then every time a defendant seeks to invoke
the exclusionary rule, he is, in fact, championing the right of third parties to be
free from Fourth Amendment violations.
257 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 115 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258 My discussion of these alternatives will be somewhat abbreviated, as I hope to develop
these further in a subsequent article.
259 See infra notes 279-313 and accompanying text.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 107-40.
261 I adopt the term, “atomistic,” from Professor Anthony Amsterdam, as have others before
me. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 367 (1974).
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Another standing decision stemming from a Fourth Amendment seizure
violation, although not involving the suppression of evidence, is worth examin-
ing here.  In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,262 the Court held that the petitioner,
who had been subjected to a choke hold during a traffic stop, had no Article III
standing to seek an injunction to prevent the city from using choke holds in the
future because he could not show a substantial enough probability that he him-
self would be subjected to another choke hold absent such an injunction.263
Professor Pamela Karlan captures the flawed reasoning of this opinion:
The only reason . . . why Lyons could even sue the city for injuries he had already
suffered was because the city had a policy that permitted the choke hold to which he
had been subjected.  It was almost a dead certainty, literally, that there would be
future injurious choke holds.  The only question was who would be victimized.  If
Lyons could not seek injunctive relief, then no one could.  And so the city could go
on choke holding individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as it was
willing to pay damages at the back end—damages that were not likely to capture the
full measure of the constitutional injury, and were thus unlikely to fully deter uncon-
stitutional conduct, precisely because the city’s policy was politically popular.  Thus,
to the extent that constitutional litigation is intended not only to compensate past
victims but to change future practices, the Lyons standing rule is
counterproductive.264
It follows from Lyons, then, that if the exclusionary rule is seen only as a
deterrent mechanism, intended to prevent future violations, then each and every
defendant would lack standing on the basis that he or she would not be able to
show a reasonable likelihood of being the victim of a future Fourth Amendment
violation.  The difference between a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing,
however, and the situation in Lyons is that the criminal defendant, because she
is seeking suppression of evidence in her own criminal prosecution, has the
Article III injury that Mr. Lyons ostensibly did not.  Thus, it makes little sense
to distinguish among criminal defendants, each of whom has established the
constitutionally required Article III injury through the prosecution itself, unless
only to limit what the Court perceives to be the high costs of exclusion.
Staying, for the time being, with the third-party standing paradigm, one
can view the defendant seeking to suppress evidence as a private attorney gen-
eral of sorts.265  This framework is especially fitting when one considers crimi-
nal procedure as a species of criminal law for police.266  With this perspective,
it has been proposed that, as a counterbalance to the good-faith exception to the
warrant requirement, courts should apply the exclusionary rule broadly and lib-
262 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
263 Id. at 105-10.
264 Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1913, 1917 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
265 See Monoghan, supra note 76, at 310-16.  In fact, Professor Monoghan asserts that the
private attorney general theory is the only logical basis for all exclusionary rule cases, as
long as the Court maintains its view of Fourth Amendment exclusion neither as a prevention
for a separate, future violation of the Amendment, nor a remedy for a completed one. Id. at
314-15.
266 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the Fourth Amendment
Scales:  The Bad-Faith “Exception” to Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 21
(1993) (discussing the parallel between government and citizens when either is a wrongdoer,
and defending their endorsement of proportional treatment).
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erally when police officers act in bad faith.267  There is something appealing
about permitting defendants to act as prosecutors in the context of unjustified
Fourth Amendment violations.  When the state seeks to convict a defendant, the
state is not seeking redress for a personal harm but is safeguarding its citizens’
collective right to be protected from criminal activity.268
Continuing in the vein of fair play and reciprocity, the Jones “legitimately
on premises” formulation deserves another look.  I agree that if the Jones Court
meant simply that a nontrespasser has standing to challenge any search occur-
ring on the entire premises, then this would create too broad a standard.269  I
propose that being legitimately on the premises provides a court with two sepa-
rate, but related, pieces of information by which to determine the level of pro-
tection a defendant can claim with respect to the premises searched, the second
of which I will discuss when I turn, a bit later, to a more collective view of
standing.  Meanwhile, the first bit of information we learn when one is legiti-
mately on the premises is that one is not trespassing.  The idea here is that if
one is wrongfully present, i.e., trespassing, one should not benefit from the
privacy of the premises, regardless of the police conduct in breaching that pri-
vacy.270  Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court in Rakas, puts a
slightly different twist on this idea with his hypothetical “burglar plying his
trade in a summer cabin during the off season.”271  For Justice Rehnquist, the
burglar is without a valid Fourth Amendment claim because his expectation of
privacy, however strong it might be subjectively, is not “legitimate” because
society would not recognize it as being reasonable.  Thus, he conflated the
“legitimately on premises” test with the “legitimate expectation of privacy”
test.
If one leaves society’s expectations out of the picture for a moment, how-
ever, and frames the issue as a matter of estoppel, as the Jones Court did, then
why not treat the police similarly?  If the police officer is wrongfully present,
and arguably the officer is trespassing if she enters onto private property with-
out a warrant (unless an exception is applicable) or valid consent, then the
government should also be estopped from benefiting from the intrusion.  If
however, both the defendant and the police are trespassing, then a court would
need to decide which party will be permitted to benefit from its wrongdoing, as
this is not a zero sum game.  This may require some balancing of interests, or
perhaps a comparison of the respective gravity of the wrongful behavior, but I
267 Id. at 23.
268 Indeed, although a bit of a stretch, one can make an analogous argument regarding a
prosecution to one that is often made against permitting third-party standing, in that the
individual victims of crime, like other third parties, are free to seek compensation for their
injuries directly through tort law.  Of course, this argument does not take into account the
state’s own, collective interest in prosecuting wrongdoing, as, of course, the argument
against third-party standing in the Fourth Amendment context fails to do.
269 This inquiry, however, should only be necessary if the defendant must show a connec-
tion to the premises, by virtue of having no possessory interest in the seized items.
270 In other words, the trespassing defendant would be estopped from claiming any privacy
in the invaded place.  “This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful
presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched.”  Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
271 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12. (1978).
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think it is fair to predict that, most likely, the evidence against the trespassing
defendant would come in.
We turn now to standing analyzed in first-party terms, but still with an
individualistic reading of the Fourth Amendment.  As an alternative to the deci-
sion in Rawlings, the Court could have overruled Jeffers insomuch as that deci-
sion recognized a possessory interest in contraband for purposes of the
exclusionary rule.272  While this alternative is not attractive from a libertarian
perspective, it is still more attractive than the Court’s current version of stand-
ing.  The result in the case is the same either way, but the contraband distinc-
tion would have left intact the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “effects” by
simply redefining “effects” so as not to include contraband.  This is not so far-
fetched, as the legislature has determined that there is no ownership interest in
contraband.273
Further, possessory crimes are unique in that, once the possession is estab-
lished, all that really needs to be determined from the seized substance itself is
whether it is contraband.  To that end, the substance can be chemically tested
but it cannot, or need not for purposes of a conviction for possession, provide
any information beyond its composition, which the Court noted in United
States v. Jacobsen.274  Thus, even maintaining a privacy-based, rather than
property-based, conception of the Fourth Amendment, the Court could poten-
tially treat contraband differently from other effects for purposes of establishing
standing based on the seizure of such effects.
I was struck, in studying the cases comprising the Burger Court’s “stand-
ing” trio, with a parallel to the “mere evidence” rule.  The mere evidence rule
had its strongest statement in Gouled v. United States,275 which held that a
warrant could not issue, and thus there could be no lawful search for, or seizure
of, anything other than contraband, fruits of a crime, or instrumentalities of a
272 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951).
273 I am not alone in making this proposal. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 17-18 (“If the
Rawlings opinion had overruled Jeffers and had emphasized the contraband nature of the
property seized, its dismissal of the claim based on ownership might not have been objec-
tionable.”). But see Simien, supra note 8, at 503 n.69 (“However, viewing the scope of the
[F]ourth [A]mendment as not protecting one’s interests in contraband is inconsistent with the
history of the amendment.”).  Professor Simien points out that the dreaded writs of assistance
at the center of the colonial grievances against the Crown were used to search for smuggled
items (particularly molasses), in which England did not recognize legitimate ownership. Id.
at 510-12.  I agree with Professor Simien that the proposed approach departs from history.
However, the approach I suggest is still more attractive than the one the Court actually took,
in which protection for all effects, contraband or not, was eliminated.
274 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984) (“The field test at issue could
disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent—whether or not a suspicious white
powder was cocaine.  It could tell him nothing more, not even whether the substance was
sugar or talcum powder. . . .  A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particu-
lar substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”).  As to the
seizure of a minimal amount of the substance in order to test it, the Court held that the
“destruction of the powder during the course of the field test was reasonable. . . .  [T]he
‘seizure’ could, at most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest.”
Id. at 125.
275 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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crime.276  Thus, searches for “mere evidence” were prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.  The rule found its basis in the idea that the government could
only seize those items to which it had a property interest superior to that of the
present possessor.  Many years later, the mere evidence rule was rejected by the
Warren Court in its war against the dominance of property rights in Fourth
Amendment discourse and doctrine.277
Thus, a variation on the contraband exception to the general protection of
effects comes to mind that would act as a sort of weakened mere evidence rule.
While the mere evidence rule in its original form permitted only searches for
contraband and fruits or instrumentalities of crime, a relaxed version of the rule
could deny standing to contest seizures of those three types of effects, yet per-
mit standing in the context of all other items.  I must repeat that I do not think
either of these variations is correct or desirable to import into standing doctrine,
and wish to stress that I am here addressing standing based solely on possession
of the seized effects.  As the Fourth Amendment protects against both searches
and seizures, and, like the Court in Jeffers, I do not think the two are so easily
severed,278 one should have standing to suppress the government’s method of
obtaining evidence if either interest—in the place searched or the items
seized—is even arguably infringed.  Nonetheless, these alternatives, which
would have permitted the Court to reach the same results, are still more protec-
tive of Fourth Amendment values and more theoretically (and textually) sound
than the doctrine announced in Rawlings.
I explore next an account of standing that may be characterized as a modi-
fied individualistic approach.  Many so-called third-party claims can, and prop-
erly should, be recast as first-party claims, implicating the right to interact with
others free from impermissible restraints.279  Thus, recalling Craig v. Boren,280
our saloonkeeper has a reciprocal right, selling beer, to the right of the under-
age males to purchase it free from discrimination that violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.281  When viewed in terms of “interactive liberty,”282 the Fourth
Amendment right can be perceived to run between a property owner and her
invitee.283  Professor Alschuler provides the term that captures the concept of
interactive liberty in the context of the Fourth Amendment with respect to pri-
vacy and information that we share with others:  “interpersonal privacy.”284
Under a theory that acknowledges a right to interpersonal privacy, the Fourth
Amendment protects the right to interact with others, to invite others into our
homes, and to choose when and with whom to share information, and recog-
276 Id. at 308.  In Rakas, the seized goods were instrumentalities (the rifle and the shells), in
Rawlings, contraband (various drugs, including 1,800 tablets of LSD), and in Salvucci, fruits
of crime (stolen mail).
277 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
278 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
279 Monaghan, supra note 76, at 297.
280 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
281 See Monaghan, supra note 76, at 300.
282 Id. at 297.
283 Id. at 302.
284 Alschuler, supra note 8.
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nizes that sharing information with a few chosen individuals is not the
equivalent of sharing it with either the public or the government.285
It is in reference to a notion of interpersonal privacy that we can tease out
an additional understanding of the “legitimately on premises” test, one that
goes beyond simply indicating that an individual is not trespassing.  In its dis-
cussion of the test, the Jones Court thrice mentioned the consent of the
owner.286  When determining the legitimacy of an individual’s presence on the
premises, then, one should examine how much privacy the owner of the prem-
ises has chosen to extend to her guest.287  The Court implicitly recognized this
interpersonal right to privacy in Minnesota v. Olson, holding that “an overnight
guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home . . . .”288
Although Justice White’s opinion for the Court observed that its holding
“merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share,”289
and that an overnight visit is considered a “longstanding social custom,”290 the
Court moved in the direction of acknowledging that, ultimately, it is the host
who has extended his privacy to the guest:
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent
with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy.  The houseguest is there
with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with
his guest.  It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the
house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control
over the premises.291
While looking to the “legitimately on premises” test to measure the pri-
vacy extended to a guest by her host is still a somewhat property-based
approach, it embraces an expansive view of privacy, in that it recognizes that
the property owner can extend as little or as much of the privacy of her home to
her guests, regardless of whether they have a possessory or ownership interest
285 Id.
286 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (“[T]he apartment belonged to a friend,
Evans, who had given him the use of it.”); id. at 265 (“[P]etitioner was present in the apart-
ment with the permission of Evans, whose apartment it was.”); id. at 267 (“As petitioner’s
testimony established Evans’ consent to his presence in the apartment, he was entitled to
have the merits of his motion to suppress adjudicated.”).  Note that the opinion does not say
that being legitimately on the premises is sufficient to win on the merits.
287 I use the term owner, rather than lessee, for example, because ultimately, permission to
be on privately owned premises must stem from the owner, in whatever form it takes.  Even
an owner, however, cannot invade the privacy of “his” property when a tenant is in posses-
sion, but this can be seen again in terms of how much of the privacy of the premises has been
transferred to the tenant through the instrument of the lease.
288 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 99.  Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the decision in Olson.  However, eight
years later, in Minnesota v. Carter, the Chief Justice authored the opinion of the Court,
finding that, as opposed to overnight guests, defendants simply on the premises for a short
time for purposes of engaging in a commercial endeavor (bagging cocaine, as it was) lacked
such a personal connection to the premises as could support a legitimate expectation of
privacy.  525 U.S. 83 (1998).  Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, cites to Professor Alschuler’s
article, supra note 8, for support of her assertion that an individual may choose “to share her
home and her associations there with persons she selects.” Id. at 107 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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in the premises, or whether they spend the night!  Will the “legitimately on
premises” test, when seen in this light, offer a simple, bright-line rule to courts?
Certainly not, and line-drawing and careful examination of the relationship
between guest and host, and guest and premises, will still be required.  How-
ever, this is preferable to a “legitimate expectation of privacy” test applied
mechanistically to categories of non-owners, such as “mere” passengers, over-
night guests, or those simply conducting business.292  And, as the Court’s thor-
ough discussion of the relationship between host and guest in Olson
demonstrates, courts are completely capable of performing just the type of anal-
ysis that would be required.293
We come, finally, to consider the broadest alternative to current standing
doctrine presented in this Article, and here, I enlist the assistance of Justice
Fortas in his concurring and dissenting Alderman opinion.294  Justice Fortas, in
support of the target theory of standing, condemned the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in the most sweeping terms:
“‘Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.  Uncon-
trolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government.’”295  The opinion continues, “In recog-
nition of the principle that lawlessness on the part of the Government must be
stoutly condemned, this Court has ruled that when such lawless conduct occurs,
the Government may not profit from its fruits.”296  Justice Fortas also drew a
distinction between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in that the Fifth Amend-
ment provides a prohibition on the government’s use of the compelled testi-
mony of a given defendant,297 whereas the Fourth Amendment “is couched in
terms of a guarantee that the Government will not engage in unreasonable
searches and seizures.”298  Thus, Justice Fortas clearly envisioned a regulatory
Fourth Amendment, and if the exclusionary rule arises from such a Fourth
Amendment, then there is no reason to limit the availability of the rule only to
292 While the first time a court applies the test may involve some inquiry into actual expec-
tations, once a category is established, it will be exceedingly difficult for a lower court to
reexamine a higher court’s finding in light of its own views of what society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.  That is the nature of the common law, despite Justice Rehnquist’s
assertion, in Rakas, that
it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of
privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in
criminal cases.  Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
293 In addition, courts are accustomed to looking at a variety of facts, or the “totality of the
circumstances,” to come to a conclusion, as they must when called on to determine the
voluntariness of a confession. See supra note 68.
294 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 200 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
295 Id. at 202-03 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting)).
296 Id. at 203.
297 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
298 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 205 (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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defendants who have had their own privacy violated by the unlawful search or
seizure.299
However, Justice Fortas’s opinion went further, and posits what I would
call, although he did not, a due process model of Fourth Amendment standing:
The Fourth Amendment is not merely a privilege accorded to him whose domain has
been lawlessly invaded.  It grants the individual a personal right, not to privacy, but
to insist that the state utilize only lawful means of proceeding against him. . . .  [I]t is
enough to give him “standing” to object that the government agents conducted their
unlawful search and seizure in order to obtain evidence to use against him. The
Government violates his rights when it seeks to deprive him of his liberty by unlaw-
fully seizing evidence in the course of an investigation of him and using it against
him at trial.300
When the State has convicted a defendant based on unconstitutionally obtained
evidence, the convicted defendant has suffered a due process violation of his
own, regardless that the evidence was obtained in violation of another’s Fourth
Amendment right.
In fact, I suggest that a robust due process model might not even be depen-
dent on the defendant having been a target of the search.  The question
becomes, then, might the fact that the government simply seeks to use unlaw-
fully obtained evidence be enough to trigger standing, on due process grounds,
to claim a Fourth Amendment violation?  This, obviously, goes further than
either the Jones Court or Justice Fortas was willing to go.  Professor Arnold
Loewy argues that there is a difference between substantive and procedural
rights.301  According to Professor Loewy, the Fourth Amendment is a substan-
tive right, and, in fact, because it permits searches on probable cause, is meant
to protect the innocent, with the guilty being “incidental beneficiaries.”302
Contrast this with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which offer procedural
safeguards for, respectively, a “person . . . in any criminal case”303 and “the
accused.”304  The Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause, for example, is
itself an exclusionary rule, prohibiting the use of compelled testimony “in any
criminal case.”  Thus, Professor Loewy argues, a violation of a procedural right
such as the self-incrimination clause demands exclusion of evidence, without
any balancing of interests or talk of deterrence, while a violation of a substan-
tive right, such as the Fourth Amendment does not, even if it is sound
policy.305
What if the Fourth Amendment is read, however, to protect all suspects,
innocent and guilty alike, by prescribing the procedural mechanism with which
the government must comply in order to conduct the search or seizure?  Look-
299 Id.
300 Id. at 206-09 (emphasis added).
301 Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:  Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 907 (1989).
302 Id. at 910; see also Colb, supra note 59, at 1669 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
aspires to maximize searches of factually guilty persons, and minimize searches of the
innocent).
303 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
304 Id. amend. VI.
305 Loewy, supra note 301, at 910.
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ing for guidance to the most famous and oft cited English precedent for the
Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff in Entick v. Carrington306 was victorious in
his trespass action alleging an unlawful search and seizure (conducted pursuant
to a general warrant) despite the fact that the search was successful in turning
up evidence of seditious libel (the seized papers).307
While the Fourth Amendment speaks of probable cause and thus, contem-
plates searches for evidence of wrongdoing, certain seizures are not addressed
by the Fourth Amendment at all and require no suspicion whatsoever, and thus,
no warrant.  I do not here refer to those seizures that the Court has determined
are not seizures for purposes of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.308
For example, seizures of one’s property are permitted, with just compensation,
under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause,309 and seizures of one’s home are
also permitted (as provided for by law) during wartime under the Third Amend-
ment.310  If the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, is concerned primarily
with the gathering of evidence, for what purpose would such evidence be gath-
ered other than to use against the suspect at trial?  Continuing along this line, if
the Fourth Amendment addresses the proper procedures for obtaining evidence
to use at trial, then the use of illegally obtained evidence against a defendant
violates due process (if not the Fourth Amendment itself).
The due process model of the Fourth Amendment I have sketched out
would, of course, promote a value of the exclusionary rule that has been all but
forgotten by the Court:  that of judicial integrity.311  By this account, a defen-
dant potentially suffers a due process violation not only when the government
306 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
307 See Knox, supra note 8, at 3-14, for a discussion of the historical background and prece-
dents, both English and colonial, of the Fourth Amendment.
308 See supra text accompanying note 29.
309 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”).
310 Id. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
311 Judicial integrity was alive and well, a proud witness to the birth of the exclusionary
rule, in Weeks v. United States.  232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”). Mapp v.
Ohio, by holding the exclusionary rule applicable to the states, “close[d] the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct.”  367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).  In United States v. Calandra, Justice Brennan
invoked the principle of judicial integrity, but his pleas did not reach the ears of the majority,
which held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings.  414 U.S. 338
(1974).
But curtailment of the evil, if a consideration at all, was at best only a hoped-for effect of the
exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective. . . .  Their concern as guardians of the Bill of Rights
was to fashion an enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantees. . . .  The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling
the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people—
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the government would not profit
from its lawless behavior . . . .
Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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introduces unlawfully obtained evidence, but also when a court permits the
inclusion of such evidence over the objections of the defendant.  The Court, in
Barrows v. Jackson,312 recognized as much when it held that the enforcement
by a state court of a restrictive covenant by the award of damages constitutes
state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.313  When the Court is
seen as a party to the due process violation, then not only does exclusion pro-
mote judicial integrity, it actually becomes the correct remedy that fits perfectly
with the violation it addresses.
VI. CONDUCT RULE BUT NO CONDUCT:  WHY IT MATTERS
Whatever approach to standing one favors, it is clear that the Burger
Court’s version was a dramatic departure from what came before314 and from
the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.  It is equally clear, recalling the defini-
tion of judicial activism provided by Professor Smith,315 that significant activ-
ism was afoot, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions.  The Court in
Rakas used standing, generally thought of as a decision not to decide, to decide
quite a lot and to narrow significantly the substantive scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  While I disagree
with the Salvucci and Rawlings Courts’ interpretation of Rakas, what Rakas
did unequivocally hold, that the inquiry of Fourth Amendment standing would
no longer be a separate threshold inquiry but be enveloped by the substantive
Fourth Amendment analysis, was equally (if not more) detrimental to the cause
of a broad, inclusive, regulatory view of the Fourth Amendment than were the
concrete restrictions of Rawlings and Salvucci.
Merging standing with the merits, especially in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, is troubling for many reasons, particularly in light of the test used
by the Court to determine both:  the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test.
Despite Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that it rests on “sounder logical foot-
ing”316 to combine the two inquiries, that is not the case.  Take, for example,
Florida v. Riley.317  The Court held that the police violated no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the defendant’s greenhouse when they observed, with
unaided eyes, marihuana plants from a helicopter flying at 400 feet.318  Obvi-
ously, Mr. Riley had standing to claim a Fourth Amendment violation, and he
did indeed make such a claim.  After all, he was the owner of the greenhouse.
And yet, he lost on the merits because he had no reasonable expectation that the
contents of his greenhouse (especially with the roof open) would remain private
from the general public, let alone the police, in light of the frequency of air
312 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
313 Id. at 254 (“To that extent, the State would act to put its sanction behind the
covenants.”).
314 As previously discussed, the Warren Court provided the means by which the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts would narrow Fourth Amendment protections. See supra notes 69-70, 220
and accompanying text; see also infra note 326 and accompanying text.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
316 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
317 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
318 Id. at 451-52.
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travel in this day and age.  Clearly, as this case demonstrates, standing is not
synonymous with the merits.
The problem is rooted in the shortcomings of the “legitimate expectation
of privacy” test and especially in the use of that test to determine both standing
and merits.  Merging standing with the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim
magnifies those shortcomings, one of which, of course, is the indeterminate
nature of the test.319  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to set forth all
the shortcomings of this particular test comprehensively, a few are particularly
worth noting.  First, as formulated by the Court, the legitimacy of the expecta-
tion is based on the consent of society.  The proper measure of a constitutional
protection should be what an individual has the right to expect, rather than what
society at any given time does actually expect or is willing to permit.320
That aside, however, even if society’s expectation is the proper gauge of
legitimate expectations of privacy, how accurately do judges evaluate what
society accepts as reasonable?  Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph
Schumacher offer compelling empirical evidence that judges often miss the
mark with their assertions of reasonableness.321  Justice White said as much in
his Rakas dissent:  “The Court’s holding is contrary not only to our past deci-
sions and the logic of the Fourth Amendment but also to the everyday expecta-
tions of privacy that we all share.”322
Further, the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test is almost necessarily a
one-way ratchet.  Although the Rakas majority cautions that “it would, of
course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations
of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding the exclu-
sionary-rule issues in criminal cases,” and clarifies that “[l]egitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” what lower
court judge, after Rakas, will reexamine for herself what people actually expect
when they travel in their friends’ automobiles?  Indeed, while it is a given that a
lower court judge cannot decide that the Supreme Court Justices simply got it
wrong, how likely is it that a future Court would level the same charge against
a past Court?  Recalling the earlier discussion of the difficulty for the Court to
admit its mistakes,323 I venture to suppose that it would be even more difficult
(and damaging to the Court’s reputation as an institution) to admit that it was
319 See Mickenberg, supra note 8, at 210 (describing the “legitimate expectation of privacy”
test as “a totally subjective test subject to political and social pressures and the personal
attitudes of individual judges and courts” that can be “turned completely on its head if a
future court should decide that society only views a defendant’s expectation of privacy as
reasonable when a property right also exists”).
320 See Simien, supra note 8, at 524 n.156 (quoting Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations
and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 536
(1978)).
321 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:  An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings Recognized
and Permitted By Society,’ 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
322 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 167 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
323 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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completely out of touch with societal norms when asserting, on society’s
behalf, what the general public does and does not consider reasonable.
Finally, it is the nature of the world we live in that our subjective expecta-
tions for privacy are constantly diminishing, in part through the government’s
own actions.324  As Professor Thomas Clancy aptly observes, “The peculiar
logic of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale, therefore, is that it
permits the scope of Fourth Amendment protections to diminish as governmen-
tal regulation increases.  Yet, the mandates of the Fourth Amendment demand
heightened, not lowered, respect, as the intrusive regulatory authority of gov-
ernment expands.”325
Another major concern with the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test is
that it shifts the focus of the Amendment itself.  Under a regulatory view, the
focus of the Amendment is most certainly on the action of the government, and
the proper substantive inquiry remains whether the government exceeded its
constitutional limitations and acted improperly.  After Rakas, the focus shifted
from scrutiny of the government’s actions, which is precisely what the Fourth
Amendment is designed to regulate, to scrutiny of the subjective, and objec-
tively legitimate, expectations of those whom the Amendment was designed to
protect.  Thus, the government’s actions, even if blatantly illegal, settled into a
position of secondary importance or, indeed, of no importance at all.
I must acknowledge what other scholars have pointed out, that Katz was
the first step in this shift of focus, with its talk of knowing exposure and what a
defendant “seeks to preserve as private.”326  Even so, an individual’s exposure
of objects or information is (or should be) less about depriving that individual
of Fourth Amendment protection and more about informing the determination
of whether the police acted in accordance with the Constitution.  If I, therefore,
place an item in open view on the sidewalk in front of my home, the police
officer walking by has not violated my (or anybody else’s) Fourth Amendment
right by seeing it.  The officer simply has not violated the Fourth Amendment,
period.  Returning to greenhouses and helicopters, and putting aside the ques-
tion of whether the Court reached the correct result, the police in Riley did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, not because Mr. Riley had no protected interest
in his greenhouse, but because when the roof was left open, the police did not
act improperly by seeing what was, in fact, available (at least in theory) to any
member of the public to see.327
324 See supra note 225.
325 Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:  Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 342 (1998) (footnote omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
326 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see, e.g., Mickenberg, supra note 8, at
209.
327 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (“Any member of the public could legally
have been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could
have observed Riley’s greenhouse.  The police officer did no more.”).  The Court also places
a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the police, in flying at 400 feet, were not breaking
the law.  The legality of the police conduct informs the expectation of privacy from such an
intrusion.  This is hard to square, however, with any searches and seizures where officers are
acting unlawfully, and even harder to square with the open fields line of cases, such as
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), in which the officers were clearly trespassing.
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In the “standing” cases, however, the police did act improperly.  As Pro-
fessor Ira Mickenberg notes, we know two things about Rakas:  “First, the
police action . . . was indisputably illegal and without probable cause.  Second,
it was equally indisputable that the defendants were guilty.”328  Thus, the only
way to allow the conviction to stand and to avoid the suppression of evidence
on remand was to decide the Fourth Amendment merits without ever consider-
ing the police conduct at all.329  However, if one accepts that the primary (or
only) rationale of the exclusionary rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations, then any decision as to whether or not the rule should be applied
should consider the police conduct underlying the search or seizure at issue.
Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the formulation of decision rules to be
informed by the relevant conduct rules the courts seek to enforce.  However,
this does not imply the reciprocal propriety of permitting decision rules to
influence the formulation of constitutional norms, or conduct rules.
By converting a decision rule such as standing, into a Fourth Amendment
conduct rule, as I believe the Court effectively did in Rakas, the Court is telling
the police, sotto voce, that if certain individuals (such as automobile passen-
gers) have no legitimate expectation of privacy in certain places (such as the
cars in which they are riding), the police may search.  And while the officers
conducting the search may be violating the owner’s Fourth Amendment rights,
they are not violating the passenger’s rights.  Thus, vis-a`-vis the passengers, the
officers are acting constitutionally.  If you take this one step further, which the
Court thankfully has not, the standing of the passengers (or lack thereof), when
perceived as defining constitutionally permissible conduct, could potentially
affect the scope of Fourth Amendment protection even as to the owner, leading
to the absurd result that any time you or I choose to share the privacy of our
cars with others, we lose our own expectation of privacy.  After all, how can I,
driving down the freeway on my way to work, reasonably expect that the gov-
ernment will not intrude into my car when my coworker, to whom I have
328 Mickenberg, supra note 8, at 220.  Professor William Stuntz describes the problem of
post-search bias when judges are deciding suppression motions as one justification for the
pre-search warrant procedure.  William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Reme-
dies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 911-13 (1991).  I imagine this bias would be magnified when an
appellate court is deciding, post-conviction, whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred
that would require reversal.
329 Mickenberg, supra note 8, at 220.  (“That was accomplished by finding that the defen-
dant had no expectation of privacy and therefore no right to complain about the police
behavior.”).  What if, however, the police conduct is proper?  For example, in Minnesota v.
Carter, a police officer, acting on an informant’s tip, looked through a gap in a closed
window blind, observing the defendants bagging cocaine in a ground-floor apartment loaned
to them for such purpose.  525 U.S. 83, 85 (1998).  The majority focused solely on the
defendants’ relationship with the premises, and the purely commercial nature of their activi-
ties there, to hold that they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. Id. at
91.  Thus, according to the majority, there was no need to examine the officer’s conduct. Id.
Justice Breyer, however, points out that, while he would have found that the defendants had
the right to expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the apartment, or, in other
words, that they had a privacy interest in the premises, they failed to take precautions that
anybody living in a basement apartment should ordinarily take in order to keep their activi-
ties hidden from the general public. Id. at 103, 105 (Breyer, J., concurring).  In other words,
the officer saw no more than any member of the public could have seen as well.
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offered a lift, sitting alongside me in the same car, expects exactly the
opposite?330
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the Burger Court intended to solidify its personal-right
vision of the Fourth Amendment by merging standing into the substantive
inquiry (a strong purposive account) cannot be known.  Taking into considera-
tion, however, factors such as the known flexibility of standing doctrine gener-
ally and the pressures, both internal, such as stare decisis rules and group
dynamics, and external, such as public perception, it is entirely possible that the
Burger Court intended precisely this result.  After all, ten years before Rakas,
the Court had already hinted, in Mancusi v. DeForte,331 that, although Mancusi
was not the case in which to do so, there might come a time when it would be
“necessary to decide whether the traditional doctrine that Fourth Amendment
rights ‘are personal rights . . .’ should be modified.”332
I have argued that the doctrinal move in Rakas, eliminating standing as a
preliminary inquiry and collapsing it into the decision on the merits, has made
it significantly more difficult for a future Court to make the decision referred to
in Mancusi.  Moreover, after Rakas, Congress is no longer free to expand the
application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court in Alderman had once invited
it to do,333 for now the applicability of the exclusionary remedy has become
coextensive with the scope of the constitutional right, as defined by the Court,
and that Congress may not alter.
I will save, for a future endeavor, a more thorough treatment of the various
standing alternatives touched on in Part V, but urge, for now, that the Court
begin by freeing standing from under the shadow of the merits.  If standing is
conceived once again as an independent, preliminary inquiry, the Court will be
free to reformulate standing in a way that will more readily permit a determina-
tion of the merits that takes into account the disputed government conduct as
well as the nature of the allegedly infringed interest.  Like the search and
seizure in Jeffers,334 the two should not be considered in isolation.  A liberal
notion of standing becomes increasingly urgent as the Court will be called upon
to reconsider its understanding of legitimate expectations of privacy in light of
advances in technology, increasing governmental regulation, and the growing
necessity of storing information, such as the websites we visit or the emails we
write, with third parties, such as Internet service providers.  As our subjective
expectations of privacy diminish, the focus on government conduct must pro-
330 Kuhns, supra note 8, at 543.  Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Carter,
voices a similar concern that denying a legitimate expectation of privacy to guests (other
than overnight guests) affects the homeowner’s security as well. Carter, 525 U.S. at 107
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A homedweller places her own privacy at risk, the Court’s
approach indicates, when she opens her home to others, uncertain whether the duration of
their stay, their purpose, and their ‘acceptance into the household’ will earn protection.”).
331 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
332 Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
333 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969).
334 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
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portionally increase, or the protections envisioned by the Framers over 200
years ago will be eviscerated simply by the passage of time.
There is no question that the Court, in Rakas,335 completely failed to
address the police (mis)conduct.  In fact, the Court began its substantive discus-
sion rather ominously:  “[W]e are not here concerned with the issue of probable
cause . . . .”336  Thus, with the shift in focus from the conduct of police officers
to the expectations of defendants, and with the incorporation of standing into
the decision on the merits, the Rakas Court set the stage for the subsequent
decisions that would rewrite the Constitution by ignoring the plain meaning of
“seizures” and “effects.”  Justice Black, in his dissent from the Katz decision
and its abandonment of the plain meaning of ordinary words, albeit to broaden
the scope of protection, hoped that the Court was finished with its “rewriting of
the Fourth Amendment.”337  Approximately a decade later, Justice Black’s
hopes may have been realized.  With its decisions in Rakas, Rawlings, and
Salvucci, the Court took a substantial step towards making sure that, at the very
least, its draft of the Fourth Amendment would not be unwritten.
335 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
336 Id. at 130.
337 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“With this deci-
sion the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
